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INTRODUCTION: AN EXPLOSION OF FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION?

The aggregate quantity of litigation in the United States, both
in comparison with other countries and over time, has been and
remains the subject of much controversy. 1 But the often heard
phrase "litigation explosion" is merely descriptive, being devoid of
any particular normative content. A recent, related, and more
specific debate concerns the nature or quality of litigation in specific
areas, including but not limited to, medical malpractice, product
liability, and securities fraud. 2 In particular, many legal and social
commentators feel that America is and has been experiencing an
explosion in so-called strike lawsuits, also known as nuisance
lawsuits or frivolous litigation.
An explosion in frivolous litigation is not normatively
neutral. A perceived rise in frivolous lawsuits alleging securities
1. Legal sociologist Professor Marc Galanter argues that an explosion in
litigation is not only foreseeable, but also socially desirable. Marc Galanter, The
Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3, 38 (1986).

But Walter

Olson, a senior fellow of the Manhattan Institute, argues that an explosion in
litigation is both man-made and socially undesirable. WALTER K. OLSON, THE
LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED

THE

LAWSUIT (Penguin Group 1991); WALTER K. OLSON, THE RULE OF LAWYERS:
HOW THE NEW LITIGATION ELITE THREATENS AMERICA'S RULE OF LAW

2.

(2003).

See, e.g., REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002)

(providing selected examples within these areas, including cases dealing with
tobacco, firearms, lead-based paint, breast implants, managed care, and insurance).
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fraud was a major impetus for the provisions imposing strict
pleading requirements contained in the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, which Congress enacted over President
Clinton's veto. 3 The politics of American litigation reform and
specific anti-litigation campaigns are an interesting reflection of
American culture, history, and society that is beyond the scope of
4
this Article.
Whether there has been such a frivolous litigation explosion
is a descriptive and historical question that is empirically challenging
to resolve because nearly all lawsuits settle, 5 with many of the
settlements involving confidentiality agreements. Everyone agrees
there is a demand for more empirical research and work about civil
procedure and litigation, 6 but unfortunately the supply of it is still
rare. 7 But positive theoretical economics can provide insights into
frivolous litigation in the form of implications from analytical,
formal, rigorous, and systematic models. 8 What procedural or

3. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(b)(2) (2000)).
4. See generally THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL
RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (2002).
5. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury:
Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 928 nn.10- 11
(2000) (providing sources for statistics that about 70% of the civil cases filed in
federal court settle; 24% ending in pretrial dismissal, default judgment, summary
judgment, or similar disposition; with only 6% proceeding to trial).
6. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV.
519, 597 (1997) (acknowledging that empirical research has identified several
settings likely to encourage frivolous litigation, but "[m]ore work is needed, of
course").
7. See, e.g., Catherine Albiston, The Rule of Law and the Litigation Process:
The Paradoxof Losing by Winning, in IN LITIGATION: DO THE HAVES STILL COME
OUT AHEAD? 168 (Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan Silbey eds., 2003) (providing an
example of empirical research about civil procedure and litigation); Stephen B.
Burbank, Amer. Judicature Soc., Rule 11 in Transition: The Report of the Third
Circuit Task Force on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (1989) (same); Kevin
M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
119, 120-21, 125-29 (2002) (advocating the importance of empirical methods on
present and future legal issues); Thomas E. Willging, Past and Potential Uses of
Empirical Research in Civil Rulemaking, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121, 1126-41
(2002) (discussing the various types of empirical research that commentators have
sought for the rule-making process); see generally Michael Heise, The Future of
Civil Justice Reform and EmpiricalLegal Scholarship: A Reply, 51 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 251 (2000).
8. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Sanctioning
Frivolous Suits: An Economic Analysis, 82 GEO. L.J. 397, 426-35 (1993)
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substantive reforms would reduce frivolous litigation is a normative
question that raises difficult concerns involving procedural fairness,
both outcome-based and process-based, in addition to questions
regarding the nature and limits of substantive rights. But normative
theoretical economics can help answer this question by identifying
and comparing
the various error and process costs of alternative
9
reforms.
This Article develops a new theory of possibly frivolous
litigation by focusing on a plaintiffs options to unilaterally abandon
a lawsuit. 10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(i) and its
various state law counterparts permit, under certain circumstances, a
plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss her lawsuit without prejudice. 1 '
A.

The Value of Litigation Abandonment Options: A
Hypothetical Example

The following hypothetical example illustrates the value of a
plaintiffs option to abandon or drop litigation. Suppose that Portia
sues Daphne. In addition, suppose that Portia's ex ante or initial
expected probability of prevailing at trial is 1/2. Suppose also that,
initially, the monetary judgment that Portia expects to win at trial is
$1,000,000.
Under these facts, Portia's actual initial expected
judgment at trial is (1/2)($1,000,000), or $500,000. Suppose that
Portia's total expected litigation cost of proceeding to a trial is
$550,000. Portia's lawsuit will have a net expected value of
$500,000 - $550,000 = -$50,000 < 0.

Now divide the lawsuit into two stages, discovery and trial,
each of which costs Portia $275,000. In addition, suppose that

(providing a formal economic model of how optimally to sanction frivolous
lawsuits).
9.

See, e.g.,

PROCEDURE

ROBERT

G.

BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL

125-57 (2003) (analyzing error and process costs in determining how

to conduct a normative study of procedural rules).
10. This novel theory was originally developed and introduced in Peter H.
Huang, Litigation Options in Civil Procedure (1997) (unpublished J.D. thesis,

Stanford University) (on file with author) and reproduced in JOSEPH A.
GRUNDFEST & PETER H. HUANG, REAL OPTIONS AND THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LITIGATION: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (Stanford Law School Olin Program in Law

and Econ., Working Paper No. 131, 1996).
11. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(i); see also Michael E. Solimine & Amy E.
Lippert, Deregulating Voluntary Dismissals, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 367, 37678, 406-18 (2003) (summarizing the state law and District of Columbia
counterparts to Rule 41(a)(1)(i) and reproducing the relevant portions of those

provisions).
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discovery resolves all of the risks of Portia's litigation, so the
posterior or ex post probability conditional upon discovery of Portia's
prevailing in court is either 0 or 1. Portia would only proceed when
she has a sure winner, and Portia would abandon a sure loser. Under
those facts, the revised initial expected value or initial option value
that the lawsuit has for Portia would be (1/2)($1,000,000 - $275,000)
- $275,000 = (1/2)($725,000) - $275,000 = $362,500 - 275,000 =

$87,500 > 0. Notice that, holding fixed the other values of the
parameters in this example, this lawsuit has initial positive option
value as long as the monetary judgment from Portia's prevailing in
court exceeds $825,000. Portia would initially file this Negative
Expected Value ("NEV") lawsuit; however, after discovery, Portia
would choose to drop this lawsuit if Portia and Daphne believe that
Portia will lose at trial.
In order to illustrate in the simplest possible way the
settlement value of this litigation, suppose that Daphne's litigation
costs are the same as Portia's costs; that is, that Daphne's total
expected litigation costs for proceeding to a trial are $550,000, with
each of discovery and trial expected to cost Daphne $275,000.
Finally, suppose that Daphne and Portia have equal bargaining
strength. Then, after discovery, Daphne and Portia either learn that
Portia has a sure loser-in which case, Portia abandons the
litigation-or Daphne and Portia learn that Portia has a sure winner.
If Portia has a sure winner, then Portia should accept any settlement
amount that exceeds what she expects to get by proceeding to trialnamely, $1,000,000 - $275,000. In addition, Daphne should offer
any settlement amount that is less than what she expects to lose by
proceeding to trial-namely, $1,000,000 + $275,000. Because
Daphne and Portia have equal bargaining power, they agree to settle
for $1,000,000, which is the midpoint of the range between
$1,000,000 - $275,000 and $1,000,000 + $275,000.

Now that we have figured out what Daphne and Portia would
settle for after discovery but before trial if both learn that Portia has a
winner, we can proceed to determine what happens before discovery.
Upon Portia's commencing the litigation, both Daphne and Portia
can reason, as we have above, that if they proceed and incur the costs
of discovery-namely, $275,000 each-then, with an initial
probability of 1/2, Portia will have a credible threat to proceed to
trial. As a result, Daphne and Portia would settle for $1,000,000
after discovery. Thus, Portia should accept any settlement amount
that exceeds what she initially expects to get by proceeding to
discovery-namely, (1/2)($1,000,000) - $275,000. In addition,
Daphne should offer any settlement amount that is less than what she
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initially expects to lose by proceeding to discovery-namely,
(1/2)($1,000,000) + $275,000. As before, because Daphne and
Portia have equal bargaining power, they will settle for
(1/2)($1,000,000), or $500,000, which is the midpoint of the range
between $500,000 - $275,000 and $500,000 + $275,000. Recall that
when the plaintiff must pay for all her litigation costs up front-that
is, when the plaintiff does not have the option to abandon the
litigation after discovery-this is a NEV lawsuit. In other words, the
plaintiffs threat for pursuing litigation is not credible, and the
settlement value is zero.
B.

Lawsuit Abandonment Options in Game-Theoretic
Litigation Models

Appendix B of this Article presents a multi-period algebraic
options game-theoretic model of litigation that generalizes the
hypothetical numerical example above by incorporating general
bargaining strengths, litigation costs, and probability beliefs on the
part of the plaintiff and the defendant. Interested readers should look
over the appendices of this Article before going forward. Appendix
A provides an accessible, nontechnical, self-contained, and userfriendly primer about options for those unfamiliar with options.
Appendix B contains a formal, mathematical game-theoretic analysis
of a plaintiffs options to unilaterally abandon a lawsuit. The rest of
this Article is organized as follows. Part II of this Article places this
Article's options approach to litigation, including quite possibly,
frivolous litigation in the context of the literature of economic
models about litigation in general and frivolous litigation in
particular. This part of the Article explains that possibly frivolous
lawsuits will be filed and settled when the values of a plaintiffs
options to unilaterally abandon litigation exceed the costs of
purchasing those litigation-abandonment options by continuing the
litigation. Part III of this Article addresses some of the limitations of
this Article's abandonment options game-theoretic model of
litigation. 12 In particular, there is reason to believe that people have
cognitive limitations in their abilities to reason backwards in
sequential interactions.1 3 Empirical and experimental evidence also

12. See also

ALEXANDER VOLLERT,

A

STOCHASTIC CONTROL FRAMEWORK

7, 42-44 (2002) (discussing
drawbacks to real-options analysis in general).
13. See, e.g., Robert Rosenthal, Games of Perfect Information, Predatory
FOR REAL OPTIONS IN STRATEGIC VALUATION

Pricing and the Chain-Store Paradox, 25 J. ECON.

THEORY

92, 94-97 (1981)
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exists that indicates that emotions affect how people make
decisions. 14 Finally, recent psychological experiments indicate that
decision makers often overvalue options and over-invest in keeping
15
options alive, even if those options present little intrinsic value.
Part IV of this Article briefly explains how and why many laws and
judicial doctrines effectively preclude specific legal options.

II.

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LITIGATION

The application of microeconomics to litigation has a
distinguished and relatively long history in the field of law and
economics. 16 A rich, related literature analyzing civil procedure that
utilizes microeconomics also exists. 17 Some legal practitioners
utilize the powerful tools of single-person decision theory and risk
analysis to help facilitate the settlement of their clients' legal
disputes. 18 But multiperson decision-making theory or game theory

(stating possible explanations for non-rational decisions in perfect-information
games).
14. See, e.g., Wilco W. Van Dijk et al., Emotional Reactions to the Outcomes
of Decisions: The Role of Counterfactual Thought in the Experience of Regret and
Disappointment, 75 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 117, 136-38
(1998) (showing evidence of how counterfactual thoughts about unfavorabledecision outcomes give rise to qualitatively different emotions, and how
anticipation of these emotions results in altered decision-making).
15. Jiwoong Shin & Dan Ariely, Keeping Doors Open: The Effect of
Unavailability on Incentives to Keep Options Viable, presented at the Society for
the Advancement of Behavioral Economics (July 31, 2003) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
16. For excellent surveys of this literature, see Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1067 (1989); ROBERT D. COOTER & THOMAS S. ULEN, LAW AND
ECONOMICS 478-99 (1st ed. 1988); Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement of
Litigation, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW
442 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
17. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Introduction: Economic Analysis of Civil
Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 303-06 (1994) (providing a representative
selection of research on the impact of law and economics on civil procedure).
18. See, e.g., David P. Hoffer, Decision Analysis as a Mediator's Tool, 1
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 113, 113-19 (1996) (stating how decision analysis is used);
Marjorie C. Aaron, The Value of Decision Analysis in Mediation Practice, 11
NEGOT. J. 123, 123-33 (1995) (discussing the value of decision analysis in
mediation practice); Marc B. Victor, The Proper Use of Decision Analysis to Assist
Litigation Strategy, 40 BUs. LAW. 617, 617-29 (1985) (discussing decision
analysis and addressing common misconceptions regarding decision analysis).
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describes a lawsuit more accurately than single-person decisionmaking theory does because of the interactive and strategic nature of
litigation. Legal scholars have applied multiperson decision theory
or game theory to analyze settlement negotiations in litigation. 19
Game theory's origins date back at least 2500 years and can be found
in classic Chinese philosophical texts. 20 Multiperson decision
theory, as game theory is more accurately and perhaps less
frivolously described, is a branch of applied mathematics; 2 1 having
numerous applications in biology, 22 economics, 23 management, 24
and politics. 25 It has become standard practice to apply game theory

19. See, e.g., ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING
TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 106-26 (2000) (discussing the
dynamics involved in dispute resolution).

20. See, e.g., SUN Tzu, THE ART OF WAR (Oxford University Press 1971)
(recognizing different theories on waging war).
21. See, e.g., HAROLD W. KUHN, LECTURES ON THE THEORY OF GAMES
(2003) (providing mathematical formulations of game theory).
22. See, e.g., JOHN MAYNARD SMITH, EVOLUTION AND THE THEORY OF
GAMES (1982) (applying game theory to the study of evolution).
23. See, e.g., AVINASH DIXIT & SUSAN SKEATH, GAMES OF STRATEGY (1999)
(providing a textbook for undergraduate game-theory courses for economics
majors); DAVID M. KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELLING (1987)
(presenting a nontechnical introduction to the strengths and weaknesses of
noncooperative (asymmetric information) game theory); ROGER A. MCCAIN,
GAME THEORY:

A NON-TECHNICAL

INTRODUCTION

TO THE

ANALYSIS

OF

STRATEGY (2004) (providing another textbook for undergraduate game-theory
courses for economics majors); MARTIN J. OSBORNE, AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME
THEORY (2004) (providing a textbook for game-theory courses for economics
graduate students); FERNANDO VEGA-REDONDO, ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY OF
GAMES (2003) (same). But see Robert J. Aumann, What is Game Theory Trying to
Accomplish?, in FRONTIERS OF ECONOMICS 28 (Kenneth J. Arrow & Seppo
Honkapohja eds., 1987) (questioning whether the goal of game theory is or should
be prediction); ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, ECONOMICS AND LANGUAGE 71-88 (2000)
(doubting the practical applicability of game theory).
24. See, e.g., DAVID M. KREPS, MICROECONOMICS FOR MANAGERS 492-589
(2004) (providing an exposition suitable for MBA students and executive
education programs of noncooperative game theory, reciprocity and collusion, and
credibility and reputation); JAMES D. MILLER, GAME THEORY AT WORK: HOW TO
USE GAME THEORY TO OUTTHINK AND OUTMANEUVER YOUR COMPETITION

(2003) (presenting case studies of how businesspeople can utilize game theory).
25. See, e.g., SCOTT GATES & BRIAN D. HUMES, GAMES, INFORMATION, AND
POLITICS: APPLYING GAME THEORETIC MODELS TO POLITICAL SCIENCE

(presenting applications of game-theoretic models
comparative politics, and international relations).

to American

(1997)
politics,
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to analyze legal rules and institutions. 2 6 Proof of the acceptance of
game-theoretic reasoning in the legal scholar's toolkit is found in the
five peer-refereed journals about law and economics. 2 7 Finally,
game theory played a crucial role in designing the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) auctions for assigning licenses
to wavelengths for personal communication services, such as cell
phones and wireless computer-access services.
Professor John
McMillan provides an excellent account of this case study, which
demonstrates the success of modem game theory, as applied to
designing optimal regulatory policy. 2 8 Professor McMillan explains
that the features of the auction format the FCC adopted essentially
were those proposed by Professors Preston McAfee, Paul R.
Milgrom, and Robert Wilson and experimentally tested by Professor
Charles Plott.2 9 As Professor McMillan stated, "When the theorists
met the policy-makers, concepts like Bayes-Nash equilibrium,
incentive-compatibility constraints, and order-statistic theorems
'3 0
came to be discussed in the corridors of power."

26. Peter H. Huang, Strategic Behavior and the Law: A Guide for Legal
Scholars to Game Theory and the Law and Other Game Theory Texts, 36
JURIMETRICS J.99, 99 (1995) (book review).
27. All five journals have published numerous articles utilizing game theory.
See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Josef Drexel, The Logic of Power in the Emerging
European Constitution:Game Theory and the Division of Power, 14 INT'L REv. L.
& ECON. 307 (1994); Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order Without More
Law: A Theory of Social Norms and OrganizationalCultures, 10 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 390 (1994); Peter H. Huang, International Environmental Law and
EmotionalRational Choice, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 237 (2002); Peter H. Huang & HoMou Wu, EmotionalResponses In Litigation, 12 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 31 (1992);
Chris William Sanchirico, Games, Information, and Evidence Production: With
Application to English Legal History, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 342 (2000); James
M. Griffin & Weiwen Xiong, The Incentives to Cheat: An EmpiricalAnalysis of
OPEC,40 J.L. & ECON. 289 (1997).
28. See John McMillan, Selling Spectrum Rights, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer
1994, at 145, 146 (discussing application of game theory to FCC assignment of
wavelength licenses) [hereinafter McMillan, Spectrum Rights]. See also John
McMillan, Market Design: The Policy Uses of Theory, 93 AM. ECON. REv. 139,
139-42 (2003) (discussing other successful applications of modem sophisticated
game theory to the optimal design of economic policy).
29. McMillan, Spectrum Rights, supra note 28, at 146; Paul R. Milgrom,
Game Theory and the Spectrum Auctions, 42 EUR. ECON. REv. 771 (1998); PAUL
R. MILGROM, PUTTING AUCTION THEORY TO WORK (2003).
30. McMillan, Spectrum Rights, supra note 28, at 146.
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A General Comparison of the Expected-Value and
Options Models ofLitigation

Three path-breaking models set the standard for the formal
economic analysis of the settlement of litigation. 3 1 First, Professor
William Landes explained why most criminal cases involve
negotiated sentences instead of trial. 32 Second, Professor Richard
Posner explained why the FTC and other administrative agencies
settle most regulatory disputes via out-of-court settlements. 33 Third,
Professor John Gould explained why most civil cases settle before
trial. 34 The Landes-Posner-Gould (LPG) single-person decision
theory expected-value approach to settlement of litigation
culminated in Professor Steven Shavell's model comparing the
incentives to sue and settle under alternative rules for allocating legal
costs. 3 5
The standard approach in law and economics models to how
people deal with risk involves assuming that legal decision-makers
maximize their expected utilities of wealth. This general assumption
often then is reduced to assuming that legal decision-makers
maximize the net present discounted values of their expected-wealth
levels. In other words, neoclassical models assume that legal
decision-makers have as their utility function over wealth, the net
present discounted value of wealth. This can be more accurately
termed an expected-value-of-wealth approach to risk.
An expected-value approach to the risks in litigation would
be appropriate if legal decision-makers in litigation were locked into
their initial decisions. What an expected-value approach to risks
ignores, however, are the opportunities to make future choices after
learning more concerning the payoff-relevant risks. In the lawsuit
context, an expected-value approach neither incorporates nor reflects
31. See THOMAS J. MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW: TORTS, CONTRACTS,
PROPERTY, LITIGATION 156-80 (1997) (providing an excellent mathematical
exposition of the economics of litigation and settlement); see also COOTER &
ULEN, supra note 16, at 413-17 (providing a less technical exposition of an

economic theory of settlement bargaining).
32. William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. &
ECON. 61, 66 (1971).

33. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and
JudicialAdministration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 416 (1973).

34. John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279,
285-86 (1973).
35. Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A TheoreticalAnalysis Under
Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 5861, 63-67 (1982).
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the value of the flexibility provided by a plaintiffs option to
unilaterally abandon litigation. 36 The values of a plaintiffs options
to abandon litigation lead to qualitatively different implications
concerning the incentives to sue, settle, or go to trial than under the
usual expected-value approach to lawsuits, and these option values
can be quite large quantitatively.
Professor Bradford Cornell was the first scholar to develop
some of the implications of the observation that plaintiffs have
unilateral options to drop a lawsuit before incurring the cost of a fullblown trial. 37 Professor Cornell showed that the option to drop a
lawsuit increases a lawsuit's expected payoff, and, hence, the
incentive to file a lawsuit. Professor Cornell's analysis extends the
LPG model in which litigation decisions were based solely on the
present discounted value of a lawsuit's costs and expected benefits
by introducing an explicit options approach to litigation. 38 William
J. Blanton applied Cornell's insights to evaluate the impact of
changes in evidentiary rules on a plaintiffs incentive to file a
lawsuit. 39
In particular, Blanton focuses on changes in the
admissibility of expert scientific testimony resulting from the
Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,Inc.40 Blanton identified four principal ways in
which any evidentiary, procedural, or substantive rule (or change in
such a rule) can reduce the value of a plaintiff's option to unilaterally
drop litigation by: (1) increasing the plaintiffs litigation costs, (2)
front-loading the plaintiffs litigation costs, (3) enhancing trial
precision, and (4) obfuscating the plaintiffs ability to predict a trial
outcome. 4 1 Frederick Dunbar and his colleagues provided optionsbased approaches to nuisance lawsuits, plaintiffs' attorneys' behavior
under contingent fee arrangements in securities litigation, securities
42
litigation reform, and settlements in shareholder class actions.

36. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(i) (allowing voluntary dismissal by plaintiff
under certain circumstances).
37. Bradford Cornell, The Incentive to Sue: An Option-PricingApproach, 19
J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (1990).
38. Id. at 176-82.
39. William J. Blanton, Reducing the Value of Plaintiff's Litigation Option in
Federal Court: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 159, 160 (1995).
40. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
41. Blanton, supra note 39, at 160-61, 182-90.
42. Frederick C. Dunbar et al., Shareholder Litigation: Deterrent Value,
Merits and Litigants' Options (Washington University John M. Olin School of
Business, Working Paper 95-07-a 26-30, 1995).
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I introduced an options model of contingency multipliers for
attorney's fees in public interest and civil rights litigation. 4 3
Professor Steven Shavell raised a set of related concerns in his
affidavit for a civil rights case where attorney's fees were hotly
contested. 44 Professor Shavell, however, did not frame his argument
explicitly in terms of the language of an options approach to
litigation. Also related are my proposals to incorporate options in
teaching corporate law 4 5 and to use an options approach toward an
understanding of why a firm could rationally choose to engage in
46
predatory pricing.
Professor Lucian Bebchuk provided a theory of NEV
lawsuits where threats to go to trial are credible due to divisibility
over time of plaintiffs' litigation costs. 47 The options model of
litigation in this Article differs from Professor Bebchuk's model
because in his model litigants face certainty over expected trial
outcomes and legal fees, while litigants in this Article's model face
uncertainty over expected judgments, litigation costs, or both. The
plaintiffs in the model of this Article have opportunities not only to
learn about expected judgments and litigation costs during the
litigation process, but also to drop litigation, conditional upon
information they learn during the course of that litigation. The
divisibility of legal costs also forms the basis for Professor William
Landes's model of unitary versus sequential trials. 48 Professor

43. See Peter H. Huang, A New Options Theory for Risk Multipliers of
Attorney's Fees in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1943 (1998)

(developing a new options-based theory of calculating attorney's fees that allows
an attorney to assess the plaintiff's probability of prevailing at trial during different
stages of the lawsuit).
44. Affidavit of Steven M. Shavell at 2-3, In re Burlington Northern, Inc.,
Employment Practices Litig., Nos. MDL 374 & 78 C269, 1985 WL 1808 (N.D. Ill.
May 31, 1985).

45. Peter H. Huang, Teaching CorporateLaw From an Option Perspective,
34 GA. L. REv. 571, 593-96 (2000).
46. Peter H. Huang, Still Preying on Strategic Reputation Models of
Predation,A Review of John R. Lott, Jr., Are Predatory Commitments Credible?
Who Should Courts Believe?, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 437 (2000).
47. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and
Success of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1996) (identifying conditions
under which a plaintiff with an NEV suit will have a credible threat and succeed in
extracting a settlement).
48. William M. Landes, Sequential Versus Unitary Trials: An Economic
Analysis, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 99 (1993) [hereinafter Landes, Sequential Versus
Unitary Trials]; see also, DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 25160 (1994) (extending Landes's model to cases in which litigants possess
unverifiable information); William M. Landes, Sequential and Bifurcated Trials, in
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Landes demonstrated that bifurcating liability and damages reduces
expected litigation costs because no need to litigate damages arises if
no liability exists. 49 In turn, such bifurcation increases the
incentives to sue, increases the minimum acceptable settlement, and
50
decreases the maximum settlement offer.
B.

Comparing the Expected Value and Options Models
of Frivolous Litigation
1.

Defining "Frivolous Litigation"

Both the positive and normative analyses of frivolous
litigation depend upon one's definition of "frivolous litigation." As
Professor Bone details, defining a frivolous lawsuit proves more
complicated than one might initially think. 5 1
An obvious definition of a frivolous lawsuit is a case in
which the plaintiff does not expect initially to prevail at trial. In
other words, the plaintiff in a frivolous lawsuit is one who has
suffered no legally recoverable damages because she either (1)
suffered no harm, or (2) if she did suffer harm, she cannot recover it
from the defendant under existing legal precedent. Her case lacks
any legal merit because her expected judgment from proceeding to a
trial is zero. Another, more inclusive definition of frivolous
litigation also includes negative-expected-value lawsuits-in other
words, litigation in which the expected judgment is greater than zero
but still remains less than the plaintiffs costs of proceeding to trial.
Such negative-expected-value ("NEV") litigation appears to be
irrational for plaintiffs to file and for defendants to settle.
A problem with both of the above definitions of frivolous
litigation is that they include cases in which litigants are seeking to
establish new legal theories that differ from existing legal precedent.
Many people, including the author of this Article, believe that novel
test cases in such legal areas as civil rights actions, e.g., actions
regarding subconscious gender discrimination and unconscious racial
discrimination, should not be considered frivolous litigation.
3

THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE

Law 438 (Peter

Newman ed., 1998) (discussing the sequential nature of litigation) [hereinafter
Landes, Sequential and Bifurcated Trials].

49. Landes, Sequential Versus Unitary Trials, supra note 48, at 113.
50. Landes, Sequential Versus Unitary Trials, supra note 48, at 115.

51. BONE, supra note 9, at 41-43; see also Bone, supra note 6, at 529-33
(discussing the problems inherent in defining frivolous litigation).
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Professor Bone defines a frivolous lawsuit as one in which a
plaintiff either (1) actually knows that the case completely, or
virtually completely, lacks any merit under the legal theories being
alleged; or (2) would have known that the case lacked merit under
the legal theories being alleged, had the plaintiff conducted a
reasonable investigation before filing. 52 This definition of frivolous
litigation clearly differs from negative-expected-value-litigation
definitions in three ways. First, Bone's definition makes no
comparison of expected judgments and litigation costs. Second, his
definition does not include as frivolous those lawsuits described in
the observation mentioned in the previous paragraph. Third, this
definition includes a second component that has no analogues in the
negative expected value definitions. In addition, as Professor Bone
details, positive net-expected-value litigation explanations of
frivolous litigation are unconvincing. 53 This is because positive netexpected-value litigation examples of frivolous litigation are due to
either a plaintiff expecting substantial nonlegal benefits or courts
making enough mistakes to imply that even a meritless lawsuit has a
high likelihood of success at trial. While both of these scenarios are
possible, neither is a sufficiently serious problem to warrant costly
regulatory intervention.
2.

Using Options Games to Develop a Definition
of "Frivolous Litigation"

A number of law and economics models address the dual
questions of why plaintiffs file frivolous lawsuits and why
defendants agree to settle frivolous lawsuits. 54 Existing models
demonstrate that litigation deemed frivolous according to the
definitions discussed above can still be worthwhile for the litigants to
pursue if any of the following situations applies: the litigants possess
different probability estimates of the plaintiff prevailing at trial; 5 5 a

52. BONE, supra note 9, at 43; Bone, supranote 6, at 533.
53. BONE, supra note 9, at 44-45; Bone, supra note 6, at 534-37.
54. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suits with Negative Expected Value, in 3 THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 551 (Peter Newman

ed., 1998) (providing excellent summaries of economic analyses of frivolous
lawsuits); BONE, supra note 9, at 20-68; Bone, supra note 6, at 534-77; MICELI,
supra note 31, at 181-200; Eric B. Rasmusen, Nuisance Suits, in 2 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 690-93 (Peter Newman ed.,

1998).
55. Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 16, at 1083-84.
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court makes a legal error; 56 the parties' litigation costs are incurred
sequentially; 57 asymmetries exist between the litigants with respect
to the size or timing of litigation costs; 58 plaintiffs have private
information concerning their cases; 59 or plaintiffs have the ability to
60
commit or pre-commit to litigation.
The questions of why a plaintiff would choose to file a
frivolous lawsuit and why a defendant would agree to settle a
frivolous lawsuit are intellectually and practically troublesome.
Asymmetric information game-theoretic models answer both
questions; however, as the phrase "asymmetric information"
suggests, these models assume that just one side of the litigation-in
other words, either the plaintiff or the defendant-realizes that the
litigation is frivolous. 6 1 In other words, no mechanism exists for
communication between the parties as to the truthful revelation of
this private information besides litigation. The 2001 Nobel Prize in
Economics recognized the pioneering research of Professors George
Akerlof, Andrew Michael Spence, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, each of
whom developed seminal concepts in the economics of symmetric
information. 62 Such concepts as lemons, pooling, separation, and
56. Keith N. Hylton, Costly Litigation and Legal Error Under Negligence, 6
J.L. EcON. & ORG. 433, 441 (1990) (reasoning that even when all "potentially
negligent actors" are exercising due care, plaintiffs may still bring suit in hope that
damages may be awarded as a result of court error).
57. See Bebchuk, supra note 47, at 10-12 (positing a situation where litigants'
costs are not incurred all at once but rather spread out over all stages of the
litigation).
58. David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought
for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 3, 9-10 (1985) (explaining
how nuisance suits arise when plaintiffs have a relatively low initial cost to sue and
defendants have a greater cost to defend themselves).
59. See Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Litigation on the Settlement of
Legal Disputes, 10 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 5 (1990) (discussing the worthwhile
nature of frivolous lawsuits in situations where plaintiffs have more information
concerning their cases than do defendants).
60. Plaintiffs can (pre-)commit to litigation by having lawyers on retainer and
paying for legal services in advance, whether or not plaintiffs undertake litigation
to trial.

HERBERT GINTIS, GAME THEORY EVOLVING: A PROBLEM-CENTERED

INTRODUCTION TO MODELING STRATEGIC INTERACTION 100-02 (2000).
61. BONE, supra note 9, at 54; Bone, supra note 6, at 542, 598-99.
62. See generally George Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Qualitative
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (providing a
pioneering model of the economic effects of dishonesty); A. Michael Spence, Job
Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973) (introducing a model in which market
signaling is defined); Michael Rothschild & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Equilibrium in
Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay in the Economics of Imperfect
Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629, 643-48 (1976) (providing asymmetric information
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signaling games play crucial roles in asymmetric information game63
theoretic models of frivolous litigation.
This Article allows for the realistic possibilities that (1)
initially, neither side of the litigation knows whether he or she is a
participant in a frivolous lawsuit, and (2) perhaps more importantly,
initially, neither side of the litigation knows for certain whether a
court will hold that the lawsuit it frivolous. For example, medicalmalpractice plaintiffs may file lawsuits, in part, from a motivation to
find out what really happened during a medical procedure that went
awry. Even if a doctor seems not to be legally negligent, an
empathetic jury might nonetheless find in favor of a sympathetic
plaintiff.
The model in Appendix B of this Article discusses litigation
that might possibly be frivolous. The adverb "possibly" reflects a
realistic feature of litigation in the sense that, during its course or
process, litigants and their attorneys will revise their expected costs
and benefits of proceeding to a trial. In other words, parties and their
lawyers will learn that a lawsuit is frivolous only after the lawsuit
commences. Frivolous litigation is not rational for plaintiffs to file
or for defendants to settle, if the litigation costs are incurred all-atonce up front or if the expected value of litigation does not change
over the course of litigation. But litigation that later turns out to be
frivolous can be initially rational for plaintiffs to file and for
defendants to settle if litigation costs are incurred sequentially and if
the expected value of litigation changes over the course of litigation.
The model in Appendix B of this Article develops a new
theory regarding frivolous litigation that provides conditions under
which litigation that may later turn out to be frivolous is initially
credible for plaintiffs to file and for defendants to settle. 6 4 This
novel theory of possibly frivolous litigation is based upon two
central features of litigation. The first aspect of litigation to note is
that, once a plaintiff makes the initial decision to file a lawsuit,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(i) and its state counterparts

competitive market equilibrium models and properties of those equilibria). For an
exposition designed for undergraduates, see IAN MOLHO, THE ECONOMICS OF
INFORMATION: LYING AND CHEATING IN MARKETS AND ORGANIZATIONS

13-14

(1997) (providing an exposition of the role of information in situations that
potentially give rise to dishonesty and breach of promise, and analyzing the
consequences for people involved). For a survey, see Joseph E. Stiglitz, The
Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics,
115 Q.J. ECON. 1441 passim (2000).
63. BONE, supra note 9, at 59-64; Bone, supra note 6, at 552-66.
64. See infra Appendix B, Proposition 1.
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provide the plaintiff with unilateral options to abandon that lawsuit
under certain circumstances. 65 The second notable feature of
litigation is that parties and their attorneys learn information
concerning their litigation over the course of that litigation.
In the particular model presented in Appendix B, no
asymmetric information exists. Therefore, one party is not learning
things that the other party already knows. Instead, both parties in
this Article's model learn information that both parties do not know,
namely the judgment at trial or the costs of litigation. In Appendix
B's model, the parties to litigation share common initial beliefs
regarding the judgment at trial and the costs of litigation. Although
the model does not restrict how parties revise their beliefs over time,
the model does assume that both sides of the litigation modify those
shared initial beliefs in the same manner, and hence, share the same
beliefs in each period of litigation. In other words, litigants do not
have to necessarily update their probability beliefs via Bayes's rule,
but they do have to utilize a common rule for how they adjust
66
probability beliefs over time.
For a decision-maker, an important benefit of learning
information is the opportunity to make choices based on that
additional information. Such potentially valuable opportunities are
precisely what decision-makers gain from having options. 67 This
central and fundamental insight underlies Professors C. Frederick
Beckner's and Steven Salop's multistage decision model of
sequential legal procedure, which computes the optimal standards of
summaty disposition (those minimizing the sum of information and
error costs) and the optimal sequence of legal and factual issues that
a court should address. 68 That insight also underlies Professor
Landes's model regarding whether a court should hold separate trials
for liability and damages, as opposed to a unified trial that considers

65. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(i) (allowing voluntary dismissal by plaintiff);
Solimine & Lippert, supra note 11, at 406-18 (cataloging the various state
analogues to the federal rule).
66. See, e.g., Peter H. Huang, Asymptotic Stability of Bayesian Updatingfor

Spencian Examples, 17 ECON. LETTERS 47 (1985) (modeling Bayesian learning of
market signaling equilibria). Bayes's rule provides a theoretical method for
making appropriate inferences in light of the information contained in statistical
observations.
67. Ronald A. Howard, Options, in WISE CHOICES: DECISIONS, GAMES, AND

NEGOTIATIONS 81 (Richard J. Zeckhauser et al. eds., 1996).
68. C. Frederick Beckner, III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and
Antitrust Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41, 54 (1999).
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both issues. 6 9 Professor Warren F. Schwartz also recognizes the
value of options when he demonstrates that separating
determinations of damages from determinations of liability could
70
reduce litigation costs.
This Article fills a niche in the literature about possibly
frivolous litigation. 7 1
This Article demonstrates how to
harmoniously blend an options approach to lawsuits with a strategic
approach to pretrial settlement bargaining. The analytical model in
Appendix B of this Article both builds upon and combines two major
literatures. The first literature is research about options, both in law
in particular and, more generally, in strategic management. The
second literature consists of game-theoretic models of litigation. The
model in Appendix B of this Article integrates these distinct
literatures into a unified game-theoretic options model of litigation.
Strategic-options models have only recently begun to appear in the
financial and management literatures. 72 These models can become
73
quite mathematically complicated rather quickly.
The model in Appendix B of this Article clarifies how and
why options analysis explains when possibly frivolous litigation can
be nonetheless credible for plaintiffs to threaten to file and for
69. Landes, Sequentialand BifurcatedTrials, supra note 48, at 438-40.
70. See generally Warren F. Schwartz, Severance-A Means of Minimizing
the Role of Burden and Expense in Determining the Outcome of Litigation, 20
VAND. L. REv. 1197 (1967).
71. See Bone, supra note 6, at 542 n.81 (noting that the existing options

approach to litigation fails to incorporate theories regarding the strategic
interactions between litigants).
72. See generally

MARION

A.

BRACH, REAL OPTIONS IN PRACTICE

33-74

(2003) (providing an introduction to games involving shared real options); Han
T.J. Smit & L.A. Ankum, A Real Options and Game-Theoretic Approach to
Corporate Investment Strategy Under Competition, FIN. MGMT., Autumn 1993, at
241 (applying option theory to evaluate investment strategies in research-and-

development and pilot programs).
73. See generally GAME

CHOICES: THE INTERSECTION OF REAL OPTIONS AND

(Steven Grenadier ed., 2000) (presenting selected papers that
provide theoretical foundations for and practical, state-of-the-art applications of
strategic real-options models). See also Steven R. Grenadier, Option Exercise
Games: The Intersection of Real Options and Game Theory, J. APPLIED CORP.
FIN., Summer 2000, at 99, 100 (illustrating how the use of real options in
conjunction with game theory leads to greater insights "into the behavior of
GAME THEORY

economic agents under uncertainty"); Steven R. Grenadier, The Strategic Exercise
of Options:Development Cascadesand Overbuilding in Real Estate Markets, 51 J.

1653, 1653 (1996) (discussing the untapped nature of the area of research
surrounding strategic-option-exercise frameworks and their application in realasset markets); VOLLERT, supra note 12, at 7-8 (giving an overview of the basic
ideas of the real-options approach to capital-budgeting finns).
FIN.
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defendants to settle. Of course, not all threatened potentially
frivolous lawsuits are going to be credible for plaintiffs to threaten to
file and for defendants to settle. In fact, Appendix B of this Article
proves that only lawsuits, including possibly frivolous ones, with
positive-net-abandonment-option values as to their expected costs,
are credible for plaintiffs to threaten to file and for defendants to
settle. 74 In other words, the gross-abandonment-option values for
each stage of litigation must exceed the cost of that stage of
litigation. The model in Appendix B of this Article demonstrates.
that lawsuits that have positive-net-expected values will also have
positive-net-option values. Thus, any lawsuit with a positive
expected value ("PEV") will be credible for a plaintiff to threaten to
75
file (and actually to file) and for a defendant to settle.
All lawsuits, including NEV lawsuits, must have positive
gross-abandonment-option value, because any random variable's
abandonment-option value is larger than or equal to its expected
value. That conclusion logically follows from the notion that the
abandonment-option value of a random variable equals that random
variable's expected value when all of the negative value realizations
of that random variable are replaced by zero.
Such a
conceptualization of the abandonment-option value of a random
variable insightfully captures a pragmatic and valuable feature of
abandonment options: namely, the flexibility to avoid negative
outcome realizations of the underlying random variable. Thus, the
abandonment-option value of any random variable, including that of
a plaintiff's expected judgment at litigation must be, non-negative by
definition.
Several economists have developed the related concept of an
option value or quasi-option value, both in the particular context of
environmental preservation and in the more general setting of
decision-making under conditions of risk. 76
The relationship
between these option values has caused some confusion in the

74. See infra Appendix B, Proposition 1.
75. See infra Appendix B, Proposition 2.
76. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow & Anthony C. Fisher, Environmental
Preservation, Uncertainty, and Irreversibility, 88 Q.J. EcON. 312, 315 (1974)

(relating the concept of a quasi-option value to the choice between preservation
and development of a natural environment); W. Michael Hanemann, Information
and the Concept of Option Value, 16 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 23, 27 (1989);
Claude Henry, Investment Decisions Under Uncertainty: The "Irreversibility
Effect," 64 AM. ECON. REv. 1006, 1007 (1974) (examining the tendency of a

decision-maker to adopt an irreversible decision).
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literature. 77 By the phrase "the option value of a random variable,"
this Article simply means the expected value of that random
variable, but with all of its negative-value realizations replaced by
zero. From this definition, it follows that, at every date, the option
value of any random variable exceeds the expected value of any
random variable.
The model in Appendix B of this Article provides four
principal ways in which any evidentiary, procedural, or substantive
rule (or change in such a rule) can increase the value of a plaintiffs
litigation-abandonment option, namely: (1) increasing the variance
of trial judgment awards, 7 8 (2) increasing the divisibility of
80
plaintiffs legal costs, 79 (3) back-loading plaintiffs litigation costs,
and (4) decreasing plaintiffs total litigation costs. 81
However, the game-theoretic options model of litigation in
Appendix B of this Article differs from game-theoretic expectedvalue models of litigation in terms of its predictions. For example, in
expected-value game-theoretic models of litigation involving riskneutral parties, a mean-preserving increase or decrease in the
variance of judgment at trial has no impact on the incentives to file,
nor does it affect the Nash-equilibrium settlement amounts. But in
the game-theoretic options model of litigation involving risk-neutral
parties, a mean-preserving increase or decrease in the variance of
judgment at trial increases or, respectively, decreases both the
82
incentives to file and the Nash-equilibrium settlement amounts.
The reason for this difference in the predictions of the gametheoretic expected-value and options models of litigation is that riskneutral litigants only care about expected values, and not variance, in
the game-theoretic expected-value model of litigation. In contrast, in
a game-theoretic options model of litigation, the option values of the
settlement amounts from litigation depend not only upon expected

77. Anthony C. Fisher, Investment under Uncertainty and Option Value in
Environmental Economics, 22 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 197, 202-03 (2000)

(offering a unifying framework for different option theories by showing
equivalence); PAUL G.C. MENSINK & TILL REQUATE, THE DIXIT-PINDYCK AND
THE ARROW-FISHER-HANEMANN-HENRY OPTION VALUES ARE NOT EQUIVALENT

(Univ. of Kiel Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. 2003-09, 2003) (clarifying the
precise relationship between these different senses of option values).
78. See infra Appendix B, Proposition 6.
79. See infra Appendix B, Proposition 11.
80. See infra Appendix B, Proposition 13.
81. See infra Appendix B, Proposition 15.
82. See infra Appendix B, Proposition 6.
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values, but also upon the variances of random variables even with
risk-neutral litigants.
A comparison of the English rule, which requires the losing
party to pay the legal fees of both sides, and the American rule,
which requires each side to pay for its own legal fees, also illustrates
the difference between the predictions of the game-theoretic
expected-value and options models of litigation. A large body of
theoretical and empirical literature exists regarding the incentives to
file a lawsuit under the American and English rules for allocating
legal costs. 83 Almost all of this literature focuses exclusively on the
average values or expected judgments of trials because risk-neutral
parties care only about means and not about variances, higher-order
moments, or any other characteristics of the distributions of trial
outcomes. Professor Shavell proved that a plaintiff is more likely to
file a lawsuit under the American rule than under the English rule if
the plaintiff does not expect to prevail because the plaintiff expects
to pay only for the plaintiffs litigation costs rather than both sides'
litigation costs. 84 Appendix B of this Article proves that, under
certain hypotheses, the filing of possibly frivolous litigation is more
likely under the English rule than under the American rule if the
probability of the plaintiff prevailing at trial is sufficiently large or if
the plaintiffs expected aggregate litigation costs sufficiently exceed
85
the defendant's expected aggregate litigation costs.

83. See, e.g., BONE, supra note 9, at 158-86 (examining the costs and benefits
of switching to the British rule); James W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder,
Litigation and Settlement Under the English and American Rules: Theory and
Evidence, 38 J.L. & ECON. 225, 248 (1995) (finding that fewer plaintiffs pursue
claims under the English rule because litigation is more costly); James W. Hughes
& Edward A. Snyder, Allocation of Litigation Costs: American and English Rules,
in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 51 (Peter
Newman ed., 1998) (noting that the English rule requires unsuccessful litigants to
pay the winner's legal costs, while the American system typically does not);
MICELI, supra note 31, at 167-70 (discussing the cost-allocation differences
between the American and English rules); Shavell, supra note 35, at 58-61, 63-67
(discussing four methods for allocating legal costs: each side bears its own costs,
losing side bears all costs, plaintiff pays only his own costs if he loses, and
defendant pays only his own costs if he loses); Edward A. Snyder & James W.
Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts Theory,
6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 345 (1990) ("An extensive theoretical literature has analyzed

how the allocation of legal costs may affect the litigation process ... .
84. Shavell, supra note 35, at 59, 75, Fig. 2.
85. See Appendix B, Proposition 7.
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Applying These Models to the Discovery
Context and Beyond

While Appendix B of this Article develops a multi-period
options model of lawsuits, this general approach to litigation can be
illustrated by making the simplifying assumption that litigation
consists only of two stages, namely discovery and trial. Because
modem liberal rules of pleading allow the survival of a fairly broad
class of claims, a plaintiffs lawyers can engage in discovery if a
plaintiff files a lawsuit and survives a defendant's motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim. 8 6 Before discovery, the plaintiffs
attorney has only filed suit and initial motions; therefore, legal fees
up to then are usually small in comparison to the sizable amounts
charged during discovery. In fact, an empirical survey of attorneys
found that about 50% of the aggregate costs of litigation are
discovery costs. 8 7 A plaintiff can avoid incurring those significant
discovery costs by dropping the litigation.
But, even if a plaintiff decides to have her attorney engage in
discovery, a plaintiff is not locked into proceeding to a trial. In fact,
discovery provides information and opportunities to update beliefs as
to the probability of the plaintiffs winning at trial. Federal and state
rules governing discovery confer upon parties the legal rights to
obtain information from other parties before trial via document
requests, interrogatories, and the deposition of witnesses. 8 8 But both
the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine limit the
information another party can discover. 8 9 The discovery process
provides a plaintiffs attorney with the opportunity to conduct
research into a case; the attorney can develop it further if it looks
promising in terms of an expected judgment or a settlement, or he
can recommend that a plaintiff drop the case if it does not look
promising.
For simplicity, assume that discovery completely
resolves the uncertainty over the actual merits of a case. Then, after

86. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (outlining the motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted).
87. THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICE,
PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 15 (Federal Judicial Center 1997).
88. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 34 (calling for production of documents); FED.

R. Civ. P. 33 (allowing interrogatories to parties); FED. R. Civ. P. 30 (providing for
oral depositions); FED. R. Civ. P. 31 (describing written depositions).
89. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen et al., A Positive Theory of the Attorney-Client
Privilege and the Work ProductDoctrine, 19 J.

LEGAL

STUD. 359 (1990) (offering

an economic model of the procedural limits on discovery based upon their
incentive effects).
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discovery, both sides of the case will know the probability of the
plaintiffs prevailing at trial is either zero or one. Therefore, in the
second period, a plaintiff will be willing to incur the sizable and
irreversible costs of trial if she learns that she has a sure winner,
while a plaintiff will drop the case unilaterally if she learns that she
has a sure loser.
90
Many sophisticated game-theoretic models of discovery,
discovery rules, 9 1 and efficient discovery exist. 92 Discovery
generates benefits and costs that differ significantly between
plaintiffs and defendants. 9 3 A defendant's cost of complying with a
plaintiffs discovery requests for non-privileged, relevant documents
can be quite substantial, whether the defendant is a corporation,
doctor, or even just another individual. 94 A clear potential for
discovery abuse exists because of the externality involved where
plaintiffs receive the informational benefits of discovery but
defendants bear its costs. 95 So, even if the discovery request will
likely produce benefits that exceed its costs, one party receives the
96
benefits from, while another party bears the costs of, discovery.
Thus, even if a discovery request is socially desirable, in the sense

90. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model
of Legal Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 438 (1994) (providing a general
strategic analysis of discovery); see also Bruce L. Hay, Civil Discovery: Its Effects
and Optimal Scope, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 481, 484-500 (1994) (extending Cooter &
Rubinfeld's analysis).
91. See generally Joel Sobel, An Analysis of Discovery Rules, 52 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 133 (1989) (discussing specific game-theoretic models).
92. Robert Mnookin & Robert Wilson, A Model of Efficient Discovery, 25
GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 219, 220 (1998).
93. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(iii) limits discovery to requests for which
compliance does not impose a burden that is likely to outweigh the benefits. FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(g)(3) allows courts to impose appropriate sanctions for violations.
94. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) provides a broad scope for discovery, including
information that need not be admissible at trial so long as the information
requested "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence."
95. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 636
(1989) (expressing judicial concern over discovery abuse). But see Linda S.
Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery
Abuse and the Consequencesfor Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393,
1432-42 (1994) (noting the anecdotal and survey nature of evidence about
discovery abuse).
96. John K. Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of
Cooperation,NuclearDeterrence,and Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 569, 581
(1989) (differentiating between informational benefits and impositional benefits of
discovery requests).
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that its benefits exceed its costs, it can provide a small plaintiff an
advantage over a large defendant, as Professors David Rosenberg
97
and Steven Shavell demonstrate in their analysis of NEV lawsuits.
Although both sides to a lawsuit can make discovery requests, a
plaintiff does not incur much cost in complying with discovery
requests when she lacks "truckloads of documents."' 98 The cost of
complying with discovery requests illustrates how litigationabandonment options may create problems akin to a strategy of
raising rival's costs in the context of business competition and the
game-theoretic industrial-organization literature. 99
More generally, a lawsuit consists not just of discovery and
trial stages. Several other stages exist, as well. The plaintiffs
lawyer files a complaint; the defendant's lawyer files a pre-answer
motion to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint, e.g., under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss "for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted;" 100 the defendant's lawyer
answers the compliant by making admissions, 10 1 making denials, 102
raising affirmative defenses, 10 3 or filing counterclaims or cross
claims; 104 the lawyers file third-party complaints; 10 5 the lawyers
amend or supplement their pleadings; 106 the lawyers make any
required automatic disclosures; 10 7 the lawyers conduct, object to,
and respond to discovery requests for the production of
documents; 108 the lawyers send and the parties must sign answers to
interrogatories; 109 the lawyers take oral depositions; 110 the lawyers

97. Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 58, at 3.
98. See also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 16, at 412 (illustrating how

"[e]xtemalizing compliance costs provides an incentive for discovery abuse"). But
see CLASS ACTION (20th Century Fox 1991) (depicting how a defendant's lawyer
can bury a plaintiff's attorney with literally truckloads of documents in complying
with a discovery request).
99. See, e.g., William P. Rogerson, A Note on the Incentivefor a Monopolist

to Increase Fixed Costs as a Barrier to Entry, 99 Q.J. ECON. 399 passim (1984)
(demonstrating why raising fixed costs benefits a dominant firm).
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b).
102. Id.
103. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c).
104. FED. R. CIv. P. 13.
105. FED. R. Cv. P. 14.
106. FED. R. CV. P. 15.
107.
108.
109.
110.

FED. R. Civ.
FED. R. Civ.
FED. R. Civ.
FED. R. Civ.

P.
P.
P.
P.

26(a).
34.
33.
30.
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request and comply with court orders for independent physical or
mental medical examinations;11I the lawyers promulgate and
respond to requests for admissions; 1 12 the lawyers file and respond
to motions for directed verdict; 113 the lawyers proceed to trial by,
among other things, conducting opening arguments, examining and
cross-examining witnesses, 114 presenting non-testimonial evidence,
and making closing arguments; the lawyers file and respond to
motions for judgment as a matter of law before a verdict (also known
under some state rules of civil procedure as motions for summary
judgment); 115 the lawyers file and respond to motions for judgment
as a matter of law after the verdict (also known under some state
rules of civil procedure as motions for j.n.o.v., which stands for
judgment non obstante veredicto);1 16 the lawyers file and respond to
motions for a new trial; 1 17 and, finally, the lawyers file and respond
to motions to alter or amend a judgment. 1 18 Thus, litigation is a
multistage process that provides plaintiffs not just a single option but
instead, a sequence of abandonment options analogous to those
found in sequential investment.
4.

Properties of Litigation Abandonment Options

Litigation abandonment options have several interesting
features. First, plaintiffs do not pay litigation abandonment option
premiums to defendants but instead, to plaintiffs' attorneys. If
plaintiffs are not paying clients, but instead are suing under
contingency fee arrangements or attorney fee award statutes, then
plaintiffs' attorneys incur litigation-abandonment-option premiums
up front. Second, defendants provide these litigation abandonment
options to plaintiffs by virtue of their activity choices and the
relevant substantive and procedural laws. Thus, changes in either
procedural or substantive law can alter the value of litigation
Third, plaintiffs' litigation abandonment
abandonment options.
options are similar to the options that a natural resources company,
oil refinery, pharmaceutical company, petrochemical firm, or, in fact,

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

FED.
FED.
FED.
FED.
FED.

R. CIv. P.
R. Civ. P.
R. Civ. P.
R. Civ. P.
R. Civ. P.

35.
36.
56.
43(a).
50(a).

116.

FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b).

117.
118.

FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a).
FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
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any business that is engaged in research and development ("R&D")
has to abandon product or process innovation. 119 But there is a very
important difference between a plaintiffs litigation abandonment
options and those in R&D. On the one hand, lawsuits are wasteful
from the joint perspective of plaintiffs, defendants, and perhaps,
society as a whole if the costs imposed upon a court, a judge, and
jury (if any) exceed the precedent and process values from
adjudication of the litigation. In litigation, the plaintiff and the
defendant will both lose if they make investments in a lawsuit, as
opposed to resolving their differences via some alternative dispute
resolution method. On the other hand, a corporation engaging in
R&D, as well as its employees, its equity owners, its debt holders, its
current and future customers, the surrounding community, and
possibly other third parties, all stand to gain from the development
and sale of a new product.
Thus, even though litigation
abandonment options are similar to other familiar examples of
options, litigation abandonment options differ from other existing
options in several important ways.

III.

LIMITATIONS OF STRATEGIC LITIGATION OPTION ANALYSIS

This part of the Article appraises limitations of an options
game-theoretic approach to litigation. Some of these limitations in
the particular context of litigation are the result of general behavioral
limitations on game-theoretic analysis. 120 First, there are cognitive
limitations as to how people conceptualize, frame, make, process,
and understand choices over time. 12 1 Second, traditional, or non-

119. See, e.g., Terrence W. Faulkner, Applying "Options Thinking" to R&D
Valuation, 39 RES. TECH. MGMT., May-June 1996, at 50 (discussing the

implications of using an options approach for the formulation of R&D strategies);
Graham R. Mitchell & William F. Hamilton, Managing R&D as a Strategic
Option, RES. TECH. MGMT., May-June 1988, at 15 (explaining why companies
might have to abandon such innovation).
120. See generally COLIN F. CAMERER, BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY:
EXPERIMENTS

IN STRATEGIC

INTERACTION (2003)

(providing an

excellent

overview of experimental research about how people actually play games).
121.

See generally TIME AND DECISION: ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL

PERSPECTIVES ON INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE (George Loewenstein et al. eds., 2003)

(presenting a fascinating interdisciplinary collection of articles about the
philosophical, evolutionary, and neurobiological underpinnings; theoretical
perspectives; and practical applications of the psychology and economics of time
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psychological, game-theoretic models assume that people do not
experience any emotions or feelings. Both of these limitations are
particularly serious in litigation settings because most litigation is
quite time-consuming and emotionally draining, if not protracted and
contentious. It is possible that, even if litigants themselves are
myopic and overly emotional, their lawyers might be more farsighted
and less emotional.
Unfortunately, however, lawyers may
exacerbate cognitive and emotional issues, due to conflicts of interest
and repeat-play considerations, such as those involving developing a
reputation for being tough or playing hardball in pretrial settlement
negotiations. 122 This part of the Article considers these limitations
in turn and explores possible responses to such limitations.
A.

Cognitive Limitations of Strategic Options Analysis

The standard procedure for solving dynamic games of
complete information utilizes a technique known as "backward
induction." 12 3 This method for calculating an equilibrium solution
to an extensive form game of perfect information starts by
determining the optimal choice for the player who moves last. It
continues by then determining the optimal course of action for the
player who moves penultimately, and so forth, until determining the
optimal decision for the player who moves first. An alternative way
to understand backward induction focuses on the sequential
rationality of players' strategies. The requirement of sequential
rationality relates to another intuitive notion: that of credibility of
threats. Professor Bebchuk systematically applied the credibility
constraint in his approach to NEV lawsuits. 124

preference); CHOICE OVER TIME (George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992)
(presenting articles about how people actually make choices over time).
122. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through
Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L.

REV. 509, 514-15 (1994) (illustrating the possibility of a prisoner's dilemma
situation in which both litigants withhold information from each other, and their
lawyers file motions to compel disclosure). But see, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients, 5 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 165, 167 (2003) (proposing a variation of the standard contingent-fee

system for compensating lawyers that would overcome the conflict of interest
between clients and their lawyers).
123.

Robert Gibbons, An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory, J. ECON.

PERSP., Winter 1997, at 127, 145.

124.

Bebchuk, supra note 47, at 1-2, 4-5, 7-8, 14-15, 23-24 (analyzing how a

plaintiff involved in a high-cost lawsuit with little chance of success can threaten
the defendant into settlement).
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As Professor Bebchuk noted, backward-induction arguments
have become standard in studying multi-period strategic
environments. 125 The history of backward-induction arguments
dates back at least to Zermelo's demonstration that in chess, either
white or black can ensure itself a draw regardless of how the other
side plays. 126 Later, the philosopher Kierkegaard said, "It is quite
true what Philosophy says: that Life must be understood backwards.
But that makes one forget the other saying: that it must be livedforwards." 127
Similarly, backward-induction arguments presume
that decision-makers have the computational ability to, and in fact
do, correctly forecast all of the future choices that are to be made in a
game. The longer or more complex a game, the more descriptively
problematic is the assumption of rational expectations about strategic
decisions. 128
Numerous experiments demonstrate that people are quite
limited in their abilities to perform backwards induction for even
relatively simple game situations. 129 The inconsistency between
empirical experimental-play results and backward-induction-based
solutions for a famous game called "the centipede game" illustrates
the predictive limitations of using backward induction arguments for
sufficiently lengthy games. 130 Even in only two-stage or three-stage
sequential-bargaining experimental games, subjects actually play
very differently from backward-induction-based equilibrium
solutions for those games. 13 1 One way to resolve these and related
backward-induction paradoxes is to posit a small degree of
uncertainty into the players' knowledge of what motivates other
players. 132

125. Bebchuk, supra note 47, at 6 n.7.
126. E. Zermelo, Uber eine Anwendung der Mengenlehre auf die Theorie
des Schachspiels, 2 PROC. FIFTH INT'L CONG. MATHEMATICIANS 501 (1913).
127. THE DIARY OF SOREN KIERKEGAARD Pt. 5, sec. 4, no. 136, 1843 entry
(Peter Rohde ed., 1960).
128. See generally DAVID M. KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC
MODELLING 77-82, 147-48 (1990).
129. See, e.g., THEODORE C. BERGSTROM & JOHN H. MILLER, EXPERIMENTS
WITH ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 395 (1997) (evaluating the results of a sequentialbargaining experiment based on the hypothetical sale of a bicycle).
130. The technical term for backward-induction-based solutions to an
extensive form game of perfect information is that of subgame perfect (Nash)
equilibria.

131.

BERGSTROM & MILLER, supra note 129, at 374-76, 394-96.

132.

See,

e.g.,

JAMES

D.

MORROW,

GAME THEORY

SCIENTISTS 279 (1994) (resolving the chain store paradox).

FOR

POLITICAL
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The game-theoretic analysis of litigation-abandonment
options in Appendix B of this Article utilizes backward-induction
arguments to analyze lawsuits, despite the fact that the above
concerns are disturbing and convincing.
Utilizing backwardinduction arguments to analyze lawsuits is appropriate because
litigants have financial and psychological incentives to be
sequentially rational. Indeed, litigants are more likely to be
sequentially rational than are experimental subjects, who may face
artificial time constraints and might lack the motivations of greed
and other emotional responses frequently found in litigation. 133
Also, even if the litigants themselves fail to be sequentially rational
due to, for example, cognitive difficulties, they hire lawyers who
provide not only legal knowledge and expertise, but also negotiating
experience and professionalism.
Presumably, part of being a
professional is being unwilling to make and carry out incredible
threats. In a sense, then, litigation involves professionals who have
reasons to be sequentially rational. Of course, both defendants' and
plaintiffs' attorneys are often repeat players and their behavior might
be rational across cases as opposed to within any given case. A final
defense is the often made hand-waving argument that market
reputation and competition discipline lawyers who fail to be
sequentially rational. In other words, lawyers who fail to be
sequentially rational by making and carrying out incredible threats
will become known for doing so and lose business to lawyers who do
not do so. They will lose business because carrying out an incredible
threat means by definition that carrying out such a threat hurts the
plaintiff.
B.

Emotional and Psychological Factors in Strategic
Options Analysis

Almost all formal economic models of litigation focus
primarily on the monetary incentives to sue, settle, or proceed to a
trial. Professors Huang's & Wu's psychological game-theoretic
models of litigation provide an exception. Their models demonstrate
how emotions such as anger, outrage, and shock can prevent or delay
settlement in litigation by changing the incentives of parties to sue,
to settle, or to go to trial. 134 In addition, the United States Supreme

133.

Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, Emotional Responses in Litigation, 12

INT'L REV. L. &ECON. 31, 32 (1992).
134. Id. at 32. See also William G. Morrison, Instincts as Reflex Choice:
Does Loss of Temper Have Strategic Value?, 31 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 335,
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Court described and endorsed the wide-ranging rights of parties to
control and participate in their litigation based upon a psychological
theory of process-based value to precluding feelings of unjust
treatment. 135 Empirical and experimental psychological research
demonstrates that people are more likely to accept an adverse
outcome and to believe that an adjudicatory process is fair if they
have the opportunity to personally participate in that process, that is,
have the adjudicator hear their stories. 136 Emotional considerations
usually predominate in particular legal areas, including, but not
necessarily limited to battery, child custody, criminal offenses,
defamation, divorce, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, invasion of privacy, medical malpractice,
products liability (especially involving bodily injury), and worker's
compensation. These areas often involve hot emotions because they
involve physical or emotional harms or invasions.
Whether a lawsuit has a positive or negative expected value
to a plaintiff, a lawsuit always has net negative expected value to a
defendant (ignoring the filing of counterclaims) because of a
defendant's litigation costs. Indeed, avoiding such costs is often the
rationale for settlement. In reality, it is not just legal costs, but also
the opportunity costs, such as the prospective harm to a defendant's
reputation, that might lead a defendant to settle a lawsuit by
effectively purchasing the plaintiffs litigation continuation options.
An often used pejorative term is that of "vexatious litigation." In a
well-known quotation from a securities-fraud lawsuit, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, William Rhenquist, spoke of the
danger of "vexatious litigation" that could result from the
prosecution of "a complaint which by objective standards may have

354 (1996) (demonstrating that, in games based upon biological-conflict models,
subordinate players can benefit from losing their tempers in asymmetric contests
with dominant opponents, and such an instinctual reaction can be robust against
evolutionary pressures and persist over time); Glenn Feltham & William G.
Morrison, Civil Disputes, the Allocation of Legal Costs and Emotional Litigation
(1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (modeling the possibility of a
plaintiff reacting emotionally to a defendant's low pretrial settlement offer by
becoming insulted, losing her temper, and making a reflex choice to proceed to
trial instead of settle, regardless of the monetary consequences of her doing so).
135. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 260-61 (1978) (stating that "a
purpose of procedural due process is to convey to the individual a feeling that the
government has dealt with him fairly").
136. See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 26-40, 61-83, 93-127 (1988) (presenting research that
examines how procedural factors affect people's perceptions of fairness of dispute
resolutions).
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very little chance of success at trial" because, among other reasons,
"the very pendency of the lawsuit may frustrate or delay normal
business activity of the defendant which is totally unrelated to the
lawsuit." 137 Exactly what constitutes a vexatious lawsuit is
debatable in the same manner as precisely what constitutes a
frivolous lawsuit.
But, certainly, the heated emotional
considerations that motivate a plaintiff to use a lawsuit to harass a
defendant provide an example of a nonmonetary aspect of vexatious
litigation.
A recent set of psychological experiments indicates that
decision-makers generally overvalue their options and exhibit a
willingness to invest greater effort and larger sums of money to keep
options viable, even when such options have little intrinsic value. 13 8
The tendencies uncovered experimentally were robust with regard to
decision-makers' experiences, information about outcomes, and
saliency about option costs. 139 In other words, options may offer
subjective values exceeding their decision-theoretic value for two
psychological reasons. First, people sometimes derive pleasure from
merely having the right to choose. 14 0 This phenomenon is perhaps
related to a desire for or illusion of control. 14 1 Second, people
sometimes experience loss aversion and a type of endowment effect
for options. 14 2 This phenomenon relates to the phenomenon of
litigants experiencing framing effects as described by prospect
theory, causing frivolous litigation and lack of settlement during
pretrial bargaining. 143

137. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740 (1975).
138. Shin & Ariely, supra note 15, at 1.
139. Shin & Ariely, supra note 15, at 4.
140. But see Ziv Carmon et al., Option Attachment: When Deliberating
Makes Choosing Feel Like Losing, 30 J. CONSUMER RES. 15, 19-20 (2003)

(presenting experimental evidence that considering options more closely may
induce consumers to become attached to choice options and feel discomfort after
choice); Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R. Lepper, When Choice is Demotivating: Can
One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 995,

996-1001 (2000) (providing both field and laboratory experimental evidence of
participants reporting higher satisfaction when their options were limited).
141. Ellen J. Langer, Experiment 2: Effects of Choice on the Illusion of
Control,32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 311, 315-17 (1975).
142. Id. at 312.
143. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, FramingFrivolousLitigation: A Psychological
Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 163, 168 (2000) (proposing that the decision frame in
frivolous litigation induces risk-averse behavior in defendants and risk-seeking
behavior in plaintiffs); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of
Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 113, 176 (1996) (suggesting that the utility model of
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Finally, the emotional and psychological costs of exercising
options in general may prevent people from exercising options that
are monetarily inexpensive. For example, most prospective law
students probably undervalue the value of beginning a legal
education because they ignore their options to drop out. In other
words, a student can decide to abandon legal education after the first
class, day, week, semester, or year of law school (or in fact anytime
before graduation). However, many law students refuse to become
legal drop-outs because doing so is too embarrassing or costly in
terms of their psyche or ego. As with most options to abandon some
course of action, people may feel a compulsion to not be quitters in
their own eyes or in those of certain observers, such as family
members, friends, or even political constituencies, in the case of
politicians who do not want a reputation for being inconsistent. The
option to modify a course of action might be less emotionally or
psychologically costly than the option to abandon or discontinue a
course of action (even though abandonment is a particular form of
modification). Thus, a student might not drop out of law school, but
might instead choose to change her course of study or legal career
path.
In conclusion, litigants experience both cognitive limitations
as well as emotional and psychological factors that are not present in
strategic options analysis of litigation. There are some reasons to
believe that lawyers might experience less of those cognitive
limitations and emotional and psychological factors in their decisionmaking, as compared to their clients. But clearly it would be helpful
to conduct further empirical research concerning how lawyers
actually behave and theoretical research about how to incorporate
cognitive limitations as well as emotional and psychological factors
into strategic options analysis of litigation.

IV.

OTHER LEGAL APPLICATIONS OF OPTIONS ANALYSIS

This part of the Article focuses on applying options analysis
to regulate other litigation options in civil procedure, preclusion law,
constitutional law, and family law. Constraints of space and time
permit only a brief glimpse of the full potential of these legal
applications. Although all the possible applications below only

litigation is less useful in describing the finer details of litigation than behavioraldecision theory).
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pertain to civil actions, numerous legal options in the areas of
criminal law and procedure, such as options provided by
prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining also exist.
A.

Other Litigation Options: An Overview

Thus far, this Article has analyzed lawsuits from the
perspective of the options that a plaintiff has to unilaterally abandon
or drop litigation. Other litigation options also arise naturally in
litigation and civil procedure. For example, some states allow for
the practice of additur, 144 in which a court denies a plaintiff's
motion for a new trial, conditional on a defendant accepting more
liability than a jury awarded. From an options perspective, additur
involves a court presenting a defendant with an option to accept
more liability than a jury award in exchange for a plaintiff not being
permitted to exercise her option to file and to later abandon a new
trial.
In the medical malpractice area, Professor Jeffrey O'Connell,
along with several co-authors, has proposed a reform plan under
which a physician has the option to make a plaintiff an early offer to
pay for economic Losses in the form of medical expenses and lost
wages. 14 5 In exchange for accepting such an offer, a plaintiff
relinquishes her option to file and later to abandon litigation for
damages to compensate for non-economic harms, unless that
plaintiff can prove that the physician was guilty of gross criminal
negligence. Applying options theory provides a qualitative, if not
quantitative, analysis of both a physician's option to make such early
offers and the forgone value of a patient's option to abandon
litigation seeking damages for pain and suffering.

144. Note that the Supreme Court prohibited additur in federal practice as
violative of the Seventh Amendment in Dmick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 478

(1935).
145. See, e.g., Jeffrey O'Connell & Andrew S. Boutros, Treating Medical
Malpractice Claims Under a Variant of the Business Judgment Rule, 77 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 373 (2002) (comparing the liability of corporate officers with the
liability of physicians); Jeffrey O'Connell & Patrick B. Bryan, More Hippocrates,

Less Hypocrisy: "Early Offers" as a Means of Implementing the Institute of
Medicine's Recommendations on Malpractice Law, 15 J.L. & HEALTH 23 (200001) (proposing that the current tort system does not promote patient safety); Jeffrey
O'Connell & Geoffrey Paul Eaton, Binding Early Offers as a Simple, If Second-

Best, Alternative To Tort Law, 78 NEB. L. REV. 858 (1999) (arguing for a binding
"early offers" neo no-fault system); Jeffrey O'Connell & James F. Neale, HMO's,
Cost Containment, and Early Offers: New Malpractice Threats and A Proposed
Reform, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. POL'Y. 287 (1998).
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Finally, an options perspective to litigation can provide not
only descriptive or positive analysis, but also prescriptive or
normative analysis of litigation-related behavior. For example,
options theory suggests that a rational and far-sighted manufacturer
should factor into the price of her product a per-unit amount for
covering the option values of products liability cases, which are
larger than merely expected litigation costs or damage awards from
defending or settling products liability cases. 14 6 But if only a single
manufacturer in a reasonably competitive market raises her prices to
cover the option values, instead of expected values of product
liability, then it might price itself out of business relative to its
competitors in the short run. Another example of prescriptive or
normative analysis comes from realizing that, all other things equal,
the deterrence impact of settlements or trials based upon the option
values of litigation exceeds the deterrence impact of settlements or
trials based upon their expected monetary damage awards. 14 7 This
relative comparison applies equally forcefully to the deterrence of
harms from accidents, contract breaches, governmental takings of
private property, and nuisances. 14 8 A final example is to analyze
how litigation abandonment options affect Professors George
Priest's and Benjamin Klein's selective-litigatidn hypothesis that a
149
nonrandom sample of cases filed will result in trial.

146. See also Blanton, supra note 39, at 185 n.135, 186 n.137 (comparing
litigation costs to stock options); COOTER & ULEN, supra note 16, at 345-46

(noting "the cost of liability will be captured in the price"); MICELI, supra note 31,
at 29-32 (discussing the accident risk factors involved in product liability cases);
A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS, 97-98, 98

tbl. 11 (3d ed. 2003) (providing a hypothetical numerical example of the price of a
product including expected accident losses).
147. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Deterrent
Effects of Settlements and Trials, 8 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 109, 110-12 (1988)
(discussing the social desirability of deterrence provided by trials).
148. Robert D. Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of
Precaution,73 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1985).

149. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). See also Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the
Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Frameworkwith Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL
STUD. 337 passim (1990) (presenting a theory for testing major litigation models);
Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputesfor Trial,
22 J. LEGAL STUD. 187 passim (1993) (presenting a selection of disputes theory
that does not require information on the identity of the litigants); MICELI, supra

note 31, at 158-59 (discussing the 50% rule for selection of disputes); George L.
Priest, Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis: Learningfrom Wittman's Mistakes,
14 J. LEGAL STUD. 215 passim (1985) (restating the selection hypothesis for

predicting which suits will be settled); L. Stanley & Don Coursey, Empirical

Winter 2004]

LITIGATION ABANDONMENT
PrecludingLegal Options

B.

This Article demonstrates that many procedural and
substantive legal rules provide options that are valuable because they

provide flexibility. It is well known, conversely, that inflexibility
can be advantageous in strategic bargaining. 1 5 0 Economists and
game theorists often speak of people utilizing (pre)commitment

devices

to

improve their bargaining position;

for example,

automobile salespeople, one member of a couple, and employers
often claim their hands are tied. An options perspective about law
also reveals that numerous legal doctrines and rules increase the
price of, if not preclude, certain other legal options. For example,
both the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct preclude certain behavior that would
otherwise be available to lawyers as options. For another example,
both state and federal sovereigns have developed a number of selflimitation doctrines and statutes that prevent them from exercising
their full adjudicatory, constitutional authority over non-local
cases. 151 Most prominent among these subconstitutional restrictions

Evidence on the Selection Hypothesis and the Decision to Litigate or Settle, 19 J.
LEGAL STUD. 145 passim (1990) (using experimental methods to test the Priest and
Klein hypothesis and other hypotheses on the private choice to litigate or settle);
Robert F. Thomas, The Trial Selection Hypothesis without the 50 Percent Rule:
Some Experimental Evidence, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 209 passim (1995) (testing the
Priest-Klein selection effect); Joel Waldfogel, The Selection Hypothesis and the
Relationship Between Trial and Plaintiff Victory, 103 J. POL. ECON. 229 passim
(1995) (developing implications of the selection hypothesis of Priest and Klein for
the relationship between trial rates and plaintiff win rates); Joel Waldfogel,

Selection of Cases for Trial, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 419 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (comparing Priest and
Klein's selective litigation hypothesis with the alternative asymmetric information
("Al") theory); Donald Wittman, Is the Selection of Casesfor Trial Biased?, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 185 passim (1985) (proposing an alternative model to Priest and
Klein's hypothesis that reaches contrary conclusions about the litigation process);
Donald Wittman, Dispute Resolution, Bargaining,and the Selection of Casesfor
Trial: A Study of the Generation of Biased and Unbiased Data, 17 J. LEGAL STUD.
313 passim (1988) (identifying case characteristics that influence the selection of
cases for trial).
150. See generally JOHN MCMILLAN, GAMES, STRATEGIES, AND MANAGERS
53-57 (1992) (outlining the benefits of "commitment strategy" and different
methods: staking your reputation, hiring agents required to follow narrow
procedures, burning bridges, etc.).
151. See generally KEVIN M. CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE: TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 27 (1999) (discussing the law of venue as an example of
state and federal self-limitation on authority to adjudicate).
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on geographic forum selection are the laws of venue and forum non
conveniens. 152
1.

Applying Options Theory to Res Judicata and
Collateral Estoppel

Another example of this concept is found in the judiciallycreated doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata. Collateral
estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, prevents the same issues
from being relitigated in subsequent lawsuits. For the doctrine of
collateral estoppel to preclude an issue, that issue must be identical,
actually litigated, decided, and necessary for the court's judgment in
a prior lawsuit. 153
The standard first-year law-school civil
procedure casebook's explanation of the reasons behind collateral
estoppel and res judicata is achieving finality or the repose of
judgments. 154 Another traditional rationale for both collateral
estoppel and res judicata is judicial economy. 155 Finally, decisional
consistency is often cited as an additional benefit of collateral
estoppel and res judicata. 156 But collateral estoppel and res judicata
both also influence the settlement values of litigation. Professor
Bruce L. Hay argues that collateral estoppel and res judicata both
function to better align the settlement values of lawsuits with their
merits. 157 The few economic analyses of collateral estoppel and res
judicata do not specifically analyze these judicial doctrines as
explicitly proscribing future litigation options. 15 8 The perspective of

152.
153.
154.

Id. at 27-30.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
See generally BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK & TONI M. MASSARO, CIVIL

PROCEDURE: CASES AND PROBLEMS 1087 (2d ed. 2001); Bruce L. Hay, Some

Settlement Effects of Preclusion,21 U. ILL. L. REV. 21, 23 n.8 (1993); ALLAN IDES
& CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND PROBLEMS 1093 (2003);
LINDA SILBERMAN & ALAN R. STEIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THEORY AND PRACTICE
725 (2001); STEPHEN N. SUBRIN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE,

AND CONTEXT 884 (2000); STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 797 (5th ed.
2000) (stating the reasons for procedural rules).
155. Hay, supra note 154, at 23 n.10 (citing ALLAN D. VESTAL, RES
JUDICATA/PRECLUSION V-10 to V-11 (1969)).
156. BONE, supra note 9, at 233-34.
157. Hay, supra note 154, at 3 1-51.
158. See Hay, supra note 154 (explaining how preclusion rules encourage
settlement); Note, Exploring the Extortion Gap: An Economic Analysis of the
Rules of CollateralEstoppel, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1940 passim (1992) (comparing
the effects of three preclusion doctrinal regimes); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 593-95 (6th ed. 2003) (analyzing incentives of the preclusion
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this Article suggests analyzing the preclusion rules of collateral
estoppel and res judicata specifically from an options perspective,
which is beyond the scope of this Article.
2.

Applying Options Theory to the Proposal and
Ratification of Constitutional Amendments

The political value of precluding some amendment options
also helps to explain the supermajoritarian requirements for the
proposal and ratification of constitutional amendments. 15 9 The
United States Constitution requires that at least two-thirds of both
160
houses of Congress vote to propose a constitutional amendment.
Alternatively, two-thirds of the state legislatures must petition
Congress to call a constitutional convention. 16 1 The second method
of proposing a constitutional amendment never has been utilized. In
addition, the United States Constitution requires three-quarters of the
state legislatures or state conventions to ratify a Constitutional
amendment. 16 2 The only amendment ratified by state conventions
16 3
was the Twenty-first Amendment, which repealed Prohibition.
Although over eleven thousand constitutional amendments have
been introduced in Congress since 1793, only thirty-three of these
have received the requisite two-thirds vote of Congress to be
submitted to the states for ratification. 16 4 Of those, six never were
ratified, including, most notably, the Equal Rights Amendment

regimes); Stephen J. Spurr, An Economic Analysis of CollateralEstoppel, 11 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 47 passim (1991) (analyzing alternative proposed rules of
collateral estoppel); Stephen J. Spurr, Collateral Estoppel, in 1 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 289 (Peter Newman ed.,
1998) (defining the preclusion doctrine in terms of stability and certainty). But see
Brainerd Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard
Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281, 285 (1957) (criticizing "the multiple claimant
anomaly" that can arise with nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel by utilizing a
hypothetical involving 50 potential plaintiffs injured by a train wreck); Jack
Ratliff, Offensive CollateralEstoppel and the Option Effect, 67 TEX. L. REV. 63,
74, 77-95 (1988) (discussing the unfairness of the litigation options that plaintiffs
have under offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel).
159. AVINASH K. DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER

UNCERTAINTY 25 (1994).
160. U.S. CONST. art. V.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
164.

LINDA R, MONK, THE WORDS WE LIVE BY: YOUR ANNOTATED GUIDE

TO THE CONSTITUTION 116 (2003).
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proposed in 1972 and, most recently, the D.C. Voting Rights
Amendment proposed in 1978.165 The constitutional amendment
process "guards equally against that extreme facility, which would
render the Constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty,
16 6
which might perpetuate its discovered faults."
3.

Applying
Options
Decision-Making

Theory

to

Judicial

A similar concern about precluding judicial and legislative
options helps explain why the current United States Supreme Court
engages in judicial minimalism. 16 7 Deciding a particular case not
only decides that case on its merits, but it also affects future activity,
behavior, and cases via precedent and the resulting effects on
incentives. In addition, the principles of analogical reasoning and
the demands of logical consistency mean that any judicial decision
might constrain or preclude future, related judicial or legislative
options to make decisions about related legal issues.
4.

Applying Options Theory to Family Law

Finally, as Professors Dixit and Pindyck suggested in their
book:
Marriage entails significant costs of courtship, and
divorce has its own monetary and emotional costs.
Happiness or misery within the marriage can be only
imperfectly forecast in advance, and continues to
fluctuate stochastically even after the event.
Therefore waiting for a better match has an option

value. 168
This Article suggests analyzing family law statutes in terms
of how they regulate the options to marry or divorce. For example,
the family law statutes of many states require couples to wait for a

165. Id.
166. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 275 (James Madison) (G. P. Putnam's Sons
ed., 1888).
167. See, e.g.,

ONE CASE AT A

MINIMALISM

(1999)

ON

CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
THE SUPREME COURT

explanations ofjudicial minimalism).
168.

DIXIT & PINDYCK, supra note 159, at 24.

TIME: JUDICIAL

(discussing examples and
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specified period of time after the application for a marriage
certificate before its issuance. 169 Symmetrically, some of these
states also stipulate that a couple may not divorce until after the
passage of a mandatory waiting period, which usually exceeds the
mandatory prenuptial waiting period. 17 0 One can understand both
types of family law statutes as raising the waiting time or nonmonetary price of, if not precluding, certain marriage or divorce
options. The debate over whether a state will legally recognize the
marriage of gay and lesbian couples effectively concerns whether a
state will preclude legal marriage options and the attendant legal
rights (themselves options) that follow. In fact, legal rights in
general are options their owners may choose not to exercise because
of either low payoffs or high costs of exercising them.

V.

CONCLUSIONS

This Article introduces a new options game-theoretic model
of possibly frivolous litigation. This novel theory is a hybrid
approach that combines an options approach to litigation incentives
and game-theoretic models of pretrial settlement negotiations. This
Article derives a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the
credible threatening and filing of possibly frivolous litigation based
on whether the option values from abandoning litigation exceed the
cost of those litigation abandonment options. Similarly, defendants
only settle those possibly frivolous lawsuits with initial positive net
(of the cost of litigation) abandonment-option values. This Article
also considers limitations of strategic litigation-options analysis.
Finally, this Article very briefly introduces other applications of
options analysis to law by pointing out other litigation options and
preclusions of legal options in various legal areas.
The technical details of this new options game-theoretic
model of possibly frivolous litigation are presented in Appendix B of
this Article. But the intuition of this new model is captured by the
numerical example presented in the Introduction. The procedural

169.

See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303(a) (West 2001) ("No

marriage license shall be issued prior to the third day following the making of
application therefor.").
170. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301(d) (West 2001) (stating that
a married couple must allege that their marriage is irretrievably broken, file
affidavits that each party consents to a divorce, and wait ninety days after
commencing such action before the court may grant a divorce).
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fact that both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 (a)(1)(i) and its state
counterparts provide a plaintiff with the option to unilaterally and
voluntarily abandon her lawsuit under certain circumstances without
prejudice provides plaintiffs litigation abandonment options with
value. If those positive option values exceed a plaintiffs expected
litigation costs, then a plaintiff will credibly threaten to and will file
a lawsuit. This Article develops a formal mathematical theory of
how to value a plaintiff's litigation abandonment options.
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A: AN OPTIONS PRIMER

What do buying a house, having children, and recalling the
governor of California have in common? These three seemingly
unrelated experiences all involve not only sequential decision
making, 17 1 but also exercising or preserving various options. House
hunting may involve looking over many houses that differ along
numerous dimensions. 172 These differences mean that it can be
difficult for a buyer to compare houses in order to determine an
optimal stopping rule for house shopping. 173 Passing on a particular
house preserves options to buy other houses, but risks losing an
option to buy that particular house later. Multiple potential buyers
might express interest in a particular house and end up bidding
against each other. A bidding contest over a house means that a
potential buyer has fewer negotiating options because she may feel
she has to make her initial bid her best offer, instead of engaging in a
series of negotiating rounds. Deciding to bid on, and then possibly
174
losing bids on, houses can become an emotional roller coaster.
The purchase of a home is part of the American dream, but for most
Americans, their home is their most expensive purchase (at least,
until then). Thus, most (at least first-time) home buyers finance part
of the price of their purchase by taking out a mortgage. Virtually
every home mortgage grants a homeowner the option to pay off the
175
mortgage early without any penalties for prepayment.
Whether and when to have children, as well as how many to
have, are various options that people face. Before (and even after) a
child is conceived, there are numerous options regarding birth

171. See generally ERIC V. DENARDO, DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING: MODELS
AND APPLICATIONS 2-3 (2d ed. 2003) (describing the ubiquitous nature of

sequential decision making).
172. See generally House Hunters (HGTV television broadcast) (depicting
the actual house-searching experiences of various first-time home buyers).
173.

ROBERT H. FRANK, MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR 288 (5th ed.

2003) (explaining that experienced realtors often show their clients two nearly
identical houses, one of which is both in better condition and less expensive than
the other, in order to provide their clients with the opportunity to make an easy
decision).
174. MARY FRANCES LUCE ET AL., EMOTIONAL DECISIONS: TRADEOFF
DIFFICULTY AND COPING IN CONSUMER CHOICE 2-9 (2001) (detailing the
emotional difficulties that consumers face in deciding among consumption
alternatives).
175. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639(c)(1)(A) (2000) (prohibiting penalties for
prepayment of principal prior to due date).
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control. Conception can be assisted by reproductive and genetic
technologies. 176 Once a child is conceived, many options exist
regarding prenatal care, whether to carry the child to full term, and
methods of delivery. But, while a woman is pregnant, she does not
have the option to become pregnant again until after her first
pregnancy concludes. In addition, numerous adoption options
exist. 1 7 7 After a child is born, parents have fewer options in terms of
alternative joint activities or purchases. Finally, numerous childrearing options exist. Of course, children have options to have their
own children.
California's 2003 gubernatorial recall election was authorized
by the California Constitution provision that provides California
voters with options to recall their elected officials. 17 8 Some social
observers and political commentators feared that California's recall
election set a dangerous precedent because it could lead to voters
exercising their options to hold recall elections of any elected
officials who make unpopular decisions. 17 9 As a result, elected
officials may come to engage in perpetual campaigning, and
elections might degenerate into no more than contests of personality
or popularity. But, fifteen states, the District of Columbia, Guam,
and the Virgin Islands already have laws that provide their voters
with options to recall elected state officials, and thirty-six states have
laws that provide their voters with options to recall various local
officials. 18 0 In fact, a Gallup Poll conducted in 1987 found that 67%
of a nationwide sample of 1009 people supported amending the
United States Constitution to provide for the recall of members of
Congress, and 55% of that same sample supported a constitutional
amendment providing for the recall of the President. 18 1 Only one-

176. See, e.g., Peter H. Huang, Herd Behavior in Designer Genes, 34 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 639 (1999) (applying economic perspectives to understand the
ethical, legal, and social issues of reprogenetic technologies for trait-enhancement
selection).
177. See, e.g., Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of
the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978) (describing the current adoption
system and analyzing how the world would look if there were a free market in
babies).
178. CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 13-18.
179. But see Richard Thompson Ford, Love It: The Recall is Pure
Democracy,

SAN

JOSE

MERCURY

NEWS,

Aug.

14,

2003,

at

http://www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/6529726.htm
(criticizing
poor
arguments against a recall of California's Governor Gray Davis).
180. THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF
INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 125, 126-27 tbl. 6.1 (1989).

181.

Id.atl32tbl.6.2.
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third of those polled opposed the idea of recalling nationally elected
officials. 182
Another common feature of buying a house, having children,
and recalling the governor of California is risk. In fact, virtually
every decision involves an element of risk. Attorneys, their clients,
elected officials, judges, jurors, legislators, litigants, negotiators,
regulators, and voters face various risks, including those arising from
appellate, contractual, electoral, financial, judicial, legislative,
regulatory, statutory, and technological sources. It is increasingly
critical for such decision-makers to respond effectively to such risks.
Just as omnipresent as risks are the methods by which individuals,
organizations, and institutions cope or deal with risks, including
diversifying, hedging, insuring, and learning. In a sense, (payoffrelevant) information can be thought of as the reduction of risk or the
negative of risk.
One particular method of handling risks is by utilizing
options. An option provides its holder with a right, as opposed to an
obligation, to choose some action in the future. The word option
"comes from the medieval French and is derived from the Latin
optio, optare, meaning to choose, to wish, to desire." 183 Options are
valuable from a decision-theoretic perspective when there are
unresolved risks because they provide the flexibility not to be locked
into an irreversible course of action. In other words, options have no
value if there is no risk and decisions are reversible. 184 After all,
risks involve not only dangers, but also opportunities. 185 Options
allow those facing risky environments to profit from the upside
potential of the risks they face, while truncating losses from the
downside possibility. Options thus offer asymmetric, kinked, or
non-linear payoffs because options permit actors to make future
decisions after learning relevant information concerning the risks
they face.
A few legal scholars already have begun to apply options
analysis to study legal rules and institutions. 186 But financial

182. Id. at 133.
183. BRACH, supra note 72, at 1.
184. VOLLERT, supra note 12, at 7-8.
185. The Chinese character for crisis is composed of two ideograms: those
for "danger" and "opportunity."
186. See, e.g., Huang, supra note 43, at 1945 (developing an options-based
theory of calculating attorney's fees); Huang, supra note 45, at 571 (proposing the
introduction of the option perspective in teaching corporate law); Mark Klock, Is It
"The Will of the People" or a Broken Arrow? Collective Preferences, Out-of-theMoney Options, Bush v. Gore, and Arguments for Quashing Post-Balloting
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economists and management scholars have been studying options
theory and its applications in the practice of financial engineering
and management science for over a quarter of a century. 187 Options

LitigationAbsent Specific Allegations of Fraud,57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 4 (2002)
(comparing the 2000 presidential election and financial options); Michael S. Knoll,
Put-Call Parity and the Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 61, 63 (2002) (showing how
the put-call parity theorem can be utilized to evade a wide range of rules); Michael
S. Knoll, Products Liability and Legal Leverage: The Perverse Effects of Stiff
Penalties, 45 UCLA L. REV. 99, 100 (1997) (describing cases in which stiffer
penalties encourage companies to produce and sell risky products); Paul G.
Mahoney, ContractRemedies and Options Pricing,24 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 passim
(1995) (using options theory to examine the choice between money damages and
specific performance); Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace,and Put Options in
the Mass Tort Class Action, 115 HARV. L. REV. 749, 755-58 (2002) (building the
case for mass tort settlements structured as a trade of punitive damages for put
options); Klaus M. Schmidt, ContractRenegotiation and Options Contracts, in 1
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 432, 432 (Peter
Newman ed., 1998) (describing the important properties of option contracts);
Alexander J. Triantis & George G. Triantis, Timing Problems in Contract Breach
Decisions, 41 J. L. & ECON. 163, 165 (1998) (providing a model of the private
incentives for the timing of anticipatory repudiation).
187. See generally MARTHA AMRAM, VALUE SWEEP: MAPPING CORPORATE
GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES

49-64 (2002) (describing how real options can be used to

value potential); Martha Amram & Nalin Kulatilaka, Disciplined Decisions:
Aligning Strategy with the FinancialMarkets, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1999, at
95-96 (describing how to make disciplined decisions, including using options to
mitigate risks); F. Peter Boer, Valuation of Technology Using Real Options, RES.
TECH. MGMT., July-Aug. 2000, at 27 (describing how real options have been used
in the valuation of oil production); BRACH, supra note 72, at 67-103 (discussing
managerial options); RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE

268-76 (7th ed. 2003) (describing the relationship between

the risk associated with an investment and its expected return);

RICHARD A.
BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, CAPITAL INVESTMENT AND VALUATION 429-49

(2003) (describing real options found in investment projects); Michael J. Brennan
& Eduardo S. Schwartz, EvaluatingNatural Resource Investments, 58 J. Bus. 135,
135 (1985) (applying option theory to evaluate the soundness of resource
investments); Michael J. Brennan & Lenos Trigeorgis, Real Options: Development
and New Contributions, in PROJECT FLEXIBILITY, AGENCY, AND COMPETITION 2-3
(Michael J. Brennan & Lenos Trigeorgis eds., 2000) (recognizing that options
theory in financial markets has been in use since the 1960s); Andrew H. Chen et
al., Valuing Flexible Manufacturing Facilities as Options, 38 Q. REV. ECON. &
FIN. 651, 651 (1998) (applying option pricing methods to evaluating equipment
such as computer-controlled machine tools); Thomas E. Copeland & Philip T.
Keenan, Making Real Options Real, MCKNSEY Q., June 1998, at 128, 129
(describing the mainstream economic utility of option valuation); TOM COPELAND
& VLADIMIR ANTIKAROV, REAL OPTIONS: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 5 (2001)

(explaining the definition of real options); Peter Coy, Exploiting Uncertainty,BUS.
WK., June 7, 1999, at 118 (describing how real options are used in business
decision-making); Avinash Dixit, Investment and Hysteresis, J. ECON. PERSP.,
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Winter 1992, at 107, 108 (observing optimal inertia for dynamic decision-making
in an uncertain environment); Avinash Dixit & Robert S. Pindyck, The Options
Approach to Capital Investment, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1995, at 105
(discussing use of options in capital investments); AVINASH K. DIXIT & ROBERT S.
PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1994) (describing the options
approach as a way to optimize investments); Glenn Hubbard, Investment Under
Uncertainty: Keeping One's Options Open, 32 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1816 (1994)
(analyzing the book INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY by Avinash Dixit and
Robert S. Pindyck, previously referenced in this footnote); Keith J. Leslie & Max
P. Michaels, The Real Power of Real Options, McKINSEY Q., June 1997, at 4, 5-6
(noting the applicability of options to other strategic situations); Timothy A.
Luehrman, Investment Opportunities as Real Options: Getting Started on the
Numbers, HARv. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1998, at 51 ("The analogy between
financial options is . . . increasingly well accepted."); Timothy A. Luehrman,
Strategy as a Portfolio of Real Options, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 90
(exploring how option pricing can be used to improve decision-making about
strategic investments); DAVID G. LUENBERGER, INVESTMENT SCIENCE 337-43
(1998) (providing an explanation for evaluating investment opportunities using
real options); Scott Mason & Robert C. Merton, The Role of Contingent Claims in
Corporate Finance, in RECENT ADVANCES IN CORPORATE FINANCE 34 (Edward
Altman & Marti G. Subrahmanyam eds., 1985) (applying an options-evaluation
framework to the strategic issue of sequencing investment projects); Robert
McDonald & Daniel Siegel, Investment and the Valuation of Firms when There is
An Option to Shut Down, 26 INT'L ECON. REV. 331 (1985) (noting the effects of a
shut-down option in a plant when future revenues or costs are uncertain); Nancy A.
Nichols, Scientific Management at Merck: An Interview with CFO Judy Lewent,
HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 88, 90-91 (noting that option analysis is a
useful tool for valuing pharmaceutical research investments); Robert S. Pindyck,
Irreversibility, Uncertainty,and Investment, 29 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1110, 111415 (1991) (comparing investment opportunities to a call option stock); REAL
OPTIONS AND INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: CLASSICAL READINGS AND

RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS passim (Eduardo S. Schwartz & Lenos Trigeorgis eds.,
2001) (covering a variety of topics related to uncertain investments and real
options); Alex Triantis & Adam Borison, Real Options: State of the Practice,J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 2001, at 8 passim (discussing effectiveness of
options analysis due to its recognition that future decisions to maximize value
depend on new information); Alexander J. Triantis & James E. Hodder, Valuing
Flexibility as a Complex Option, 45 J. FIN. 549, 549 (1990) (noting that
"[c]ontingent claims pricing techniques have been used to value a project's...
'real options'); Lenos Trigeorgis, Real Options and Interactions with Financial
Flexibility, FIN. MGMT., Autumn 1993, at 202, 203-16 (1993) (providing overview
of real options literature and presenting principles for quantifying the value of
various real options); REAL OPTIONS IN CAPITAL INVESTMENT: MODELS,
STRATEGIES, AND APPLICATION passim (Lenos Trigeorgis ed., 1995) (integrating
new contributions to the growing real options literature); LENOS TRIGEORGIS,
REAL OPTIONS: MANAGERIAL FLEXIBILITY AND STRATEGY IN RESOURCE
ALLOCATION 227-71 (1996) (exploring generally the interactions among multiple
real options); W. Carl Kester, Today's Options for Tomorrow's Growth, HARV.
Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1984, at 153, 154 (describing future investment
opportunities as analogous to ordinary call options on securities).
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are classified as financial or real. 18 8 Financial options are contracts
that give their holders the right, but not an obligation, to buy (or sell)
a particular quantity of some underlying financial asset at a certain
price on (or before) a certain date. 18 9 Examples of underlying
financial instruments on which options are written include bonds,
stocks, commodities (such as corn, soybeans, wheat, gold, or silver)
futures contracts, foreign currencies, or stock indices. A vast
literature addresses the financial theory, institutional details, pricing
models, regulation, and valuation of various financial options. 19 0
Because options concepts, ideas, and terminology may not be
familiar to some readers, this appendix offers a brief overview about
options in general. 19 1 A call option provides its owner with the
right, but not an obligation, to buy a specified quantity of some
underlying item at some price called the strike or exercise price. 19 2
A put option provides its owner with the right, but not an obligation,
to sell a specified quantity of an underlying item at some price called
the strike or exercise price. 19 3 An option's price is called its
premium in order to avoid confusion with exercise or strike
prices. 1 94 An option is at-the-money if the current price of the item
equals the strike price.
A call option is out-of-the-money
(respectively, in-the-money) if the current price of the underlying
item the option is written on is less (respectively, greater) than its
exercise price.
Similarly, a put option is out-of-the-money
(respectively, in-the-money) if the current price of the underlying
item the option is written on is greater (respectively, less) than its
exercise price.
The intrinsic value of a call (respectively, put) option is the
difference between the current price of the underlying item on which
the option is written and the strike price (respectively, the difference
188.

BRACH,

supra note 72, at 1.

189. WILLIAM L. MEGGINSON, CORPORATE FINANCE THEORY 226 (1997).
190. For institutional details about financial options and their regulation, see
generally Peter H. Huang, A Normative Analysis of New FinanciallyEngineered
Derivatives, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 471 (2000); Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch
of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation, 55 MD. L. REV. 1, 41-47 (1996).

For the financial theory of and pricing models for stock options, see generally
RICHARD

A.

MANAGEMENT

BREALEY

&

STEWART

C.

MYERS,

FINANCING

AND

RISK

181-208 (2003) (explaining how to spot and value financial

options).
191. See, e.g., Huang, supra note 43, at 1943-47 (providing a more detailed
introduction to options).
192. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 204-205 (6th ed. 1990).
193. Id. at 1094.
194. Id.
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between the strike price and the current price of the underlying item
that the option is written on). Even an option that is currently out-ofthe-money has a positive (although possibly, very small) value
because of its time value. The time value of an option will be
positive (although possibly, very small) as long as the option has not
yet expired because, in the remaining time before its expiration, an
option may finish in-the-money. It is, of course, true, symmetrically,
that an option may finish out-of-the-money. But, because options do
not require their owners to buy or sell the underlying items on which
the options are written, rational option holders will simply choose
not to exercise options that are out-of-the-money. The flexible
nature of an option explains why, intuitively, an option always has a
value that is nonnegative, gross of the option premium, because the
holder of an option can decide not to exercise the option.
Financial options permit decision-makers to hedge financial
types of risk such as those arising from fluctuations in stock prices,
interest rates, or currency rates. 195 Financial options are a type of
state-contingent securities. Professor Kenneth J. Arrow, a recipient
of the 1972 Nobel Prize in Economics, introduced the concept and
theory of state-contingent securities in a paper that he presented in
1952.196 Many of today's exotic financial derivatives that Wall
Street investment banks create, such as catastrophe bonds (whose
payoffs are linked to natural disasters such as earthquakes and
hurricanes), 197 utilize Professor Arrow's work. 198 Professor Robert
J. Shiller has proposed the creation of even more contingent
securities markets to hedge aggregate-income risks, home-price
risks, income-distribution-inequality risks, intergenerational risks,
international risks, and livelihood risks. 199 Professor Stephen A.
Ross proved that, under certain assumptions, trading simple financial
call and put options written on a single index of existing securities
195.

See generally Peter H. Huang, Securities Price Risks and Financial

Derivative Markets, 21 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 589 (2001) (discussing how

financial options permit decision-makers to hedge financial risks).
196. Kenneth Joseph Arrow, The Role of Securities in the Optimal
Allocation of Risk Bearing, 31 REv. ECON. STUD. 91 (1964) (providing English
translation of original paper).
197.

HAL R. VARIAN,

INTERMEDIATE

MICROECONOMICS:

A MODERN

APPROACH 219-20 (6th ed. 2003).
198. Arrow, supra note 196,passim.
199. See generally ROBERT J. SHILLER, MACRO MARKETS: CREATING
INSTITUTIONS FOR MANAGING SOCIETY'S LARGEST ECONOMIC RISKS passim

(1993) (proposing creation of markets to hedge economic risks); ROBERT J.
SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21 ST CENTURY passim (2003)

(proposing new risk management infrastructure to secure economic gain).
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can realize any possible desired pattern of payoffs across
200
contingencies and over time.
Financial options have revolutionized modem financial
markets by facilitating the reallocation of underlying financial
market risks. The 1997 Nobel Prize in Economics recognized the
path-breaking financial option-pricing models of Professors Fisher
Black, Robert C. Merton, and Myron S. Scholes. 2 0 1 Widely
publicized, huge losses from trading in financial options by wellknown corporations such as Barrings Bank, Dell Computer, Gibson
Greetings, and Procter & Gamble; 2 02 municipalities such as Orange
County, Califomia; 2 0 3 and hedge funds such as Long-Term Capital
Management (LTCM) 20 4 illustrated the potential dangers from

200. Stephen A. Ross, Options and Efficiency, 90 Q.J. EcON. 75, 84-86
(1976). See also Fred Arditti & Kose John, Spanning the State Space with
Options, 15 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1 passim (1980) (strengthening
Ross's theorem); Kose John, Efficient Funds in a FinancialMarket with Options:
A New Irrelevance Proposition, 36 J. FIN. 685 passim (1981) (extending and
generalizing Ross's theorem); Rolf W. Banz & Merton H. Miller, Pricesfor StateContingent Claims: Some Estimates and Applications, 51 J. BUS. 653, 653 (1978)
(presenting a method "for making risk adjustments in practical capital budgeting
applications"); Douglas T. Breeden & Robert H. Litzenberger, Prices of StateContingent Claims Implicit in Option Prices, 51 J. Bus. 621, 622 (1978) (applying
Ross's theorem). See generally Huang, supra note 190, at 477 (explaining the
financial engineering implications of Ross's theorem).
201. See generally Fischer Black & Myron S. Scholes, The Pricing of
Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973) (developing a
theoretical valuation formula for call options); Robert C. Merton, Theory of
Rational Option Pricing,4 BELL J. ECON. 141, 141 (1973) (discussing "the further
extension of the theory to the pricing of corporate liabilities"). See Robert A.
Jarrow, In Honor of the Nobel Laureates Robert C. Merton and Myron S. Scholes:
A Partial Differential Equation That Changed the World, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall
1999, at 229 (explaining the many contributions and ramifications of BlackMerton-Scholes option pricing theory); JOHN SUTTON, MARSHALL'S TENDENCIES:
WHAT CAN ECONOMISTS KNOW? 35-47 (2000) (explaining how and why option
pricing models are so successful).
202. Brandon Becker & Jennifer Yoon, Derivative FinancialLosses, 21 J.
CORP. L. 215, 216-18 (1995) (listing examples of financial losses that have been
described by the press as related to financial derivative instruments).
203. PHILLIPE JORION, BIG BETS GONE BAD: DERIVATIVES AND
BANKRUPTCY IN ORANGE COUNTY passim (1995).
204. Franklin R. Edwards, Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term
Capital Management, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1999, at 189, 197-200; ROGER
LOWENSTEIN,

WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM

CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 163 (2000); NICHOLAS DUNBAR, INVENTING MONEY: THE
STORY OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT AND THE LEGENDS BEHIND IT

230 (2000).

197-
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speculation in financial options. 205 Recently, many commentators
have questioned whether incentive compensation in the form of
executive stock options contributed to the series of corporate fraud
and mismanagement scandals, and whether companies should
206
expense their executive stock options.
Real options involve decisions concerning activities whose
risks have not been completely reduced to financial assets or
financial commodities. 20 7 Real options are so named to differentiate
them from financial options such as well-known executive stock
options. 208 The phrase "real options" in corporate finance refers to
the options that managers have to add value to an organization by
adjusting its production plans; 209 alter capacity, output levels, or
scale of operations; break up, divide, or partition investment
opportunities; defer before (further) investing; switch inputs, outputs,
or production methods; and grow from a pilot project. 2 10 Indeed,
any dynamic investment opportunity presents a sequence of real
options. 2 11 For example, business-deal-making negotiations entail

205. See Peter H. Huang et al., Derivatives on TV: A Tale of Two
Derivatives Debacles in Prime-Time, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 257 (2001) (comparing
alternative depictions of the dangers of derivatives in two television programs).
206. See, e.g., FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: How DECEIT AND RISK
CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 156-60 (2003) (describing how
compensating CEOs with stock options led to fraud).
207. See Stewart C. Myers, Determinantsof CorporateBorrowing, 5 J. FIN.
ECON. 147, 163 (1977) (coining the phrase "real options").
208. See Don M. Chance, A Derivative Alternative as Executive
Compensation, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 6 (questioning the ability of
executive stock options, at least as they are typically granted, to align the interests
of executives with those of shareholders); RON S. DEMBO & ANDREW FREEMAN,
THE RULES OF RISK: A GUIDE FOR INVESTORS 207-22 (1998) (discussing the
possibly unexpected and perverse incentive effects of utilizing stock options in
employee compensation).
209. See Peter Christoffersen & Andrey Pavlov, Company Flexibility, the
Value of Management and Managerial Compensation (Jan. 20, 2003) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (presenting a real-options model explaining the
staggering variation in managerial compensation in firms of similar sizes across
industries and countries).
210. See generally BRACH, supra note 72, at 67-103; BREALEY & MYERS,
supra note 187, at 616-41; DIXIT & PINDYCK, supra note 187, at 6-25;
TRIGEORGIS, supra note 187, at 1-4, 9-20, 121-50.
211. See, e.g., Frank T. Magiera & Robert A. McLean, Strategic Options in
CapitalBudgeting and Program Selection under Fee-For-Service and Managed
Care, HEALTH CARE MGMT. REv., Fall 1996, at 7 (explaining how to apply real
options analysis to healthcare management).
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numerous real options. 2 12 Multinational corporations face numerous
2 13
real options in making foreign investments.

In describing a generic decision-making setting, the phrase

"real option" implies that options theory is applicable to analyzing

the sequential choices that are inherent in such a dynamic and
2 14
uncertain environment. Real options have a fascinating history.
Familiar (and perhaps, some unfamiliar) examples of real options
include the options to: abandon, perhaps temporarily (i.e. mothball) a
project; 2 15 become delinquent in property-tax payments; 2 16 breach a
contract and pay liquidated or expectation damages; 2 17 build or
2 18
develop real-estate property versus delaying construction;
continue with education; 2 19 declare bankruptcy; 2 2 0 delay a

212.

See generally

RICHARD

RAZGAITIS,

DEALMAKING:

USING REAL

OPTIONS AND MONTE CARLO ANALYSIS 175 (2003) (introducing a real-options

approach to valuing and negotiating business projects).
213.

See generally KIRT C. BUTLER, MULTINATIONAL FINANCE 461-87 (3d

ed. 2004) (providing examples of various real options in cross-border
investments).
214. BRACH, supra note 72, at 13-15.
215. See, e.g., Brennan & Schwartz, supra note 187, at 147-50 (discussing
the utility and relative efficiency of temporary or permanent abandonment of a
project); Stewart C. Myers & Saman Majd, Abandonment Value and Project Life,
in 4 ADVANCES IN FUTURES AND OPTIONS RESEARCH 1 passim (1990) (analyzing
the option to abandon for salvage value).
216. See generally Brendan O'Flaherty, The Option Value of Tax
Delinquency: Theory, 28 J. URBAN ECON. 287 (1990) (applying option theory in
measuring the threat of confiscation of property for failure to pay property taxes).
217. See Mahoney, supra note 186, at 150 (discussing the application of
options theory to remedies in lawsuits arising out of breach of contract).
218. See, e.g., Paul D. Childs et al., Mixed Uses and the Redevelopment
Option, 24 REAL ESTATE ECON. 317, 319 (1996) (concluding that options provide

needed flexibility in determining the proper use of land in redevelopment
projects); David Geltner, On the Use of the FinancialOption Price Model to Value
and Explain Vacant Urban Land, 17 AM. REAL ESTATE & URBAN ECON. ASSOC. J.

142 passim (1989) (reviewing the financial option model of under-utilization of
urban land); Steven R. Grenadier, The Strategic Exercise of Options: Development
Cascades and Overbuildingin Real Estate Markets, 51 J. FIN. 1653 passim (1996)
(focusing on the timing of real estate development and how that timing shapes
market behavior); Sheridan Titman, Urban Land Prices Under Uncertainty, 75
AM. ECON. REV. 505 (1985) (discussing the pricing of vacant lots and when it is
rational to postpone building until a later date).
219. Uri Dothan & Joseph Williams, Education as an Option, 54 J. Bus. 117
(1981) (explaining a general valuation equation for determining if education is a
viable option and stressing the role of education as an option to postpone
commitment to a specific career).

Winter 2004]

LITIGATION ABANDONMENT

project; 22 1 dissolve a business arrangement, marital or corporate
union, merger, partnership, or any other form of ongoing or steady
relationship; 2 22 drill, develop, or start production from oil wells; 22 3
engage in venture capital start-up investing; 224 exchange one asset
for another; 225 heat new construction with electricity, heating oil, or
natural gas; 226 lease airplanes, assets, copiers, power plants, real
estate, satellites, trucks, or zoo animals; 227 maintain academic
employment under faculty tenure; 22 8 make a movie from a script and
follow-up sequels if the original movie is a box office success; 229

220. Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision
Making, 17 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 356, 358-66 (2001) (exploring the decision of
declaring bankruptcy and alternative options that may be available).
221. Jonathan E. Ingersoll, Jr. & Stephen A. Ross, Waiting to Invest:
Investment and Uncertainty, 65 J. Bus. 1 (1992); Saman Majd & Robert S.
Pindyck, Time to Build, Option Value, and Investment Decisions, 18 J. FIN. ECON.
7 passim (1987) (using contingent claims analysis to derive optimal decision rules
and to value investments).
222. Dixit, supra note 187, at 105 (describing how any investment can be
seen as an option).
223. See, e.g., Jeff Strand, Taxes and Nonrenewable Resources: The Impact
on Exploration and Development (July 1996) (unpublished manuscript, available
at http://www.ssrn.com) (analyzing the effects of tax laws on the last three
options).
224. Pascal Botteron & Jean-Francois Casanova, Start-ups Defined as
Portfolios of Embedded Options, International Center for Financial Asset
Management and Engineering Research Paper No. 85 (May 2003) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
225. See generally William Margrabe, The Value of an Option to Exchange
One Asset for Another, 33 J. FIN. 177 (1978) (developing an equation for the value
of the option to exchange one risky asset for another).
226. BRACH, supra note 72, at 7-8. See also Nalin Kulatilaka, The Value of
Flexibility: The Case for a Dual-Fuel Industrial Steam Boiler, FIN. MGMT.,
Autumn 1993, at 271 passim (explaining the value of an industrial facility which
can be fueled by gas or oil).
227. See, e.g., Steven R. Grenadier, Valuing Lease Contracts: A RealOptions Approach, 38 J. FIN. ECON. 297 (1995) (developing a unified model for
pricing a variety of leasing contracts using a real-options approach to derive the
term structure of lease rates); Stephen E. Miller, Economics of Automobile

Leasing: The Call Option Value, 29 J.

CONSUMER AFFAIRS

199 passim (1995)

(discussing options involved in leasing a car).
228. See generally John G. McDonald, Faculty Tenure As a Put Option. An
Economic Interpretation,55 Soc. SCI. Q. 362 (1974).
229. See generally AMRAM, supra note 187, at 155-70; Martha Amram, The
Value of Film Studios, J. APPLIED CORP FIN., Summer 2003, at 24; Laura Martin &
Patrick Wang, Film Studio Reel Options (May 11, 2001), Credit Suisse First
Boston Equity Research, available at http://www.valuesweep.com/ csfb_
filmoptions5l 101.pdf; ZIv BODIE & ROBERT C. MERTON, FINANCE 448-50
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purchase assets, items, or properties; 2 30 threaten to employ fewer
workers if a firm has a flexible production technology; 2 3 1 throw
away food obtained from an all-you-care-to-eat buffet or freely
dispose of items generally; try predatory pricing or to leverage
monopoly power in one market into monopoly power in another
2 33
market; 2 3 2 and utilize (export or import) quota licenses.
Real-options theory applies financial option-pricing models
to derive qualitative, if not (yet) quantitative, estimates of real-option
Many quantitative financial and real-option-pricing
values. 2 3 4
models assume that the underlying risks evolve over time according
to a particular stochastic process, known as geometric Brownian
motion with drift. 2 3 5 Although there is no reason that such a
distributional assumption would accurately describe litigation risks
in general, other quantitative option-pricing models, such as the
binomial or two-state option-pricing model, may approximately
describe a particular lawsuit.2 3 6 More generally, qualitative, as
opposed to quantitative, financial- and real-option valuation models
apply to litigation-abandonment options because qualitative optionvaluation models make no distributional assumptions regarding the
stochastic process of underlying risks. 2 3 7 Nonetheless, qualitative

(2000).
230. See, e.g., John E. Stonier, What is an Aircraft Purchase Option Worth?
Quantifying Asset Flexibility Created Through Manufacturer Lead-Time
Reductions and Product Commonality, in HANDBOOK OF AIRLINE FINANCE 231
(Gail F. Butler & Martin R. Keller eds., 1997).
231. See Nalin Kulatilaka & Stephen Gary Marks, The Strategic Value of
Flexibility: Reducing the Ability to Compromise, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 574, 575

(1988) (discussing downsizing in the context of incomplete contracting and the
options value of flexibility).
232. Huang, supra note 46, at 437, 442-43.
233. James E. Anderson, Quotas as Options: Optimality and Quota License
Pricingunder Uncertainty, 23 J. INT'L ECON. 21 passim (1987).
234. MEGGINSON, supra note 189, at 292 n.42.
235. See, e.g., J. MICHAEL STEELE, STOCHASTIC CALCULUS AND FINANCIAL
APPLICATIONS 29-40 (2001) (outlining the concept of Brownian motion); LARS
TYGE NIELSEN, PRICING AND HEDGING OF DERIVATIVE SECURITIES 13 (1999)

(providing examples of both geometric Brownian motion and generalized
Brownian motion).
236. James Cox et al., Option Pricing: A Simplified Approach, 7 J. FIN.
ECON. 229 (1979); Richard J. Rendleman & Brit J. Barter, Two-State Option
Pricing, 34 J. FIN. 1093, 1093-98 (1979) (presenting an elemental two-state

option-pricing model that can be used to solve many complex option-pricing
problems).
237. See, e.g., John C. Cox & Stephen A. Ross, A Survey of Some New
Results in Financial Option Pricing Theory, 31 J. FIN. 383, 384-89 (1976)
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option-valuation models provide upper and lower bounds for option
38
values. 2

(presenting option-pricing results that are distribution- and preference-free).
238. See Merton, supra note 201, at 142-60 (deriving restrictions on optionpricing formulae based upon the assumption that investors prefer more wealth to
less wealth); Hal R. Varian, The Arbitrage Principle in FinancialEconomics, J.
ECON. PERSP., Fall 1987, at 62-64 (deriving bounds for option prices based upon
the no-arbitrage condition).
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B: A GAME-THEORETIC OPTIONS MODEL OF LITIGATION

This appendix introduces a game-theoretic options model of
possibly frivolous litigation under the assumption that defendants
and plaintiffs maximize their expected net wealth and initially have
incomplete but common knowledge regarding all information
concerning their litigation. This appendix adopts these quite strong
assumptions to focus attention on the additional and novel insights
provided by viewing litigation from an options-theoretic perspective.
This Article demonstrates that options analysis generates different
conclusions and implications from those of expected value analysis
under an identical set of assumptions. Litigation costs are stochastic
processes in the game-theoretic options model in this appendix.
More generally, litigants might choose the levels of litigation
expenditures as endogenous variables as opposed to facing litigation
costs that are exogenously distributed random variables. It is left for
another day to model endogenous litigation expenditures in a
strategic options analysis of litigation.
A.

Notation

The following notation is used in the formal model. Denote
the plaintiffs total litigation costs by P. Denote the defendant's total
litigation costs by D. Divide the number of stages in pretrial
bargaining by the index t = 1, . . . , n. All money values at periods
t > 1 are denominated in terms of their present discounted values at
t = 1 (using a common discount rate or factor). Let It represent the
plaintiffs litigation costs at stage t. Thus, by definition, P = ZlnIt.
Let Ct represent the defendant's litigation costs at stage t. Then, by
definition, D = yJnCt. Let Pt denote the plaintiffs remaining
litigation costs after stage t. Then, by definition, Pt = ytnIk. Let
EI(Pt) denote the initial expected present value of plaintiffs
remaining litigation costs once stage t is reached. Let Dt denote the
defendant's remaining litigation costs once stage t is reached. Then,
by definition, Dt = tnCk. Let El(Dt denote the initial expected
present value of defendant's remaining litigation costs once stage t is
reached.
Let a denote the relative bargaining strength of the
plaintiff; so that, 0 < a < 1.
At stage t, the size of the dollar amount of judgment expected
at trial is Jt. At stage t, the subjective probability of the plaintiff
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prevailing at trial is denoted pt. At stage t, the expected value of the
judgment expected at trial is defined as xt = ptJt. Denote the initial
net present discounted expected value of the settlement if the
litigation settles at stage t by El(st). Solving recursively via
backwards induction, El(st) = x] + aEl(Dt)-(1-a)El(Pt). Let
OVl(st) be the initial abandonment-option value of the settlement at
stage t. Finally, let El(It) be the initial present-expected value of the
plaintiffs litigation cost at stage t.
The following game-theoretic options model of lawsuits
assumes that (Jt}, {It}, and (Ct) are stochastic processes, whose
distributions are agreed upon and common knowledge among the
litigants and their attorneys. Recall that the litigants are assumed to
be risk-neutral, to share a common discount rate, and to face no
effective wealth constraints. Finally, Jt, It, and Ct are assumed to be
independent random variables at each t.
B.

Necessary and Sufficient Conditionsfor the Credible
Filingof Litigation

This characterization of the incentives to file lawsuits
illustrates the power of backwards induction.
Proposition 1: A necessary and sufficient condition for a
lawsuit to be filed is that the initial value of all the abandonment
options exceed the initial value of their expected costs or premiums.
In other words, for all t = 1, ...

,

n; these inequalities hold at date 1:

O Vil(sdt >El (It)

Proof: (a) Necessity: If for any t < n, OVl(st) < El(It); then
both parties expect at stage 1 that the plaintiff will not continue the
lawsuit at stage t. Thus, reasoning backwards, both parties expect at
stage 1 that the plaintiffs threat at stage t to continue the lawsuit is
not credible.
(b) Sufficiency: Conversely, if for all t <n OVl(st) > El(It);
then both parties expect at stage 1 that the plaintiff will at each stage
t be able to credibly threaten to continue the lawsuit for its
abandonment option value at that stage.
It is straightforward to show that any Positive-ExpectedValue (PEV) lawsuit will always satisfy the above condition.
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Proposition 2: If a lawsuit has PEV, then all of the
abandonment options will have initial values that exceed their initial
expected cost.
Proof: A PEV lawsuit by definition satisfies xl > Ej(P).
Because P = y I nlti and It > 0 for all t, it follows that x1 > El(It) +
EI(Pt) for all t. So, aXl > aEl(t) and (1-a)xl > (1-a)El(It)+(1a)E1 (Pt) for all t: Adding these last two inequalities together results
in the inequality, xl - (1-a)El(Pt) >El(It)for all t. This implies that
xi + aEl(Dt)-(1-a)El(Pt) > El(It) for all t because aEl(Dt) > 0.
But, El(st) = xi + aEl(Dt)-(1-a)El(Pt) by definition. So, for all t;
El(st) > El(It). Finally, by the definition of abandonment-option
value, we conclude that for all t: OVl(st) > El(st) > El (It).
Thus, a lawsuit having PEV is a sufficient, but not necessary
condition for a lawsuit to be credibly filed by a plaintiff. The last
step in the proof of the above corollary, namely that for all t, OVl(st)
> El(st), is merely an instance of the more general proposition that at
every date, the abandonment-option value of a random variable is
greater than its expected value.
This is true because the
abandonment-option value of a random variable can be thought of as
being equal to its expected value with all of its negative-value
realizations replaced by zero.
C.

Litigation-Abandonment
Option
Equilibrium Settlement Amounts

Values

and

In expected-value litigation models, the parties compare their
deterministic cash outflows from the costs of litigation with their
probability weighted expected monetary payoffs to litigation. If the
parties have the same expected values for trial, they will settle rather
than go to court, in order to save on trial costs (even if they are riskneutral) or because they are risk-averse (even if trial costs are zero).
Parties only go to trial if they have sufficiently different beliefs about
the probability that the plaintiff will prevail at trial or about the size
of the judgment if the plaintiff should win at trial. In expected-value
litigation models, different expected values for the outcome of trial
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are necessary, but not sufficient for trial. 2 39 Settlement occurs if and
only if there is a range of mutually acceptable settlement amounts.
This interval will be non-empty if and only if the difference between
the plaintiffs expected gain and the defendant's expected loss from
going to trial is less than the sum of their litigation costs. The parties
will settle immediately at an amount in the range of mutually
acceptable settlement amounts. The precise settlement amount in
that range is determined by the values of the parties' relative
bargaining strengths. A similar immediate settlement result holds
true in this game-theoretic options model of lawsuits, the difference
being the value of the settlement amount. 240
Proposition 3: If the parties to litigation share the same initial
common probability beliefs (pt} and have common knowledge over
(Jt}, (It}, and {Ct}, then both parties will agree to settle the litigation
in period 1 for the Nash equilibrium amount S* = OVl(sl) > El(s1).
Proof: If the litigants share common prior probability beliefs
regarding the distributions of the relevant random variables, then
they also will agree on the values of OVl(st) and Elt) and the
inequality conditions in Proposition 1 being satisfied for all t < n.
Thus, they will agree to settle immediately to avoid incurring
litigation costs. In other words, the defendant will effectively agree
to buy the plaintiffs initial abandonment option for its value
OVl(sl), which is at least as large as the net present discounted
expected value of the lawsuit, El(s1).
In this game-theoretic options model, all lawsuits are settled
immediately in the case of homogeneous probability beliefs (Pt}
between the plaintiff and defendant and common knowledge
regarding the distributions of (Jt}, {It}, and {Ct}. As with settlement
in game-theoretic expected-value models, the settlement amount in
this game-theoretic options model is constructed iteratively period by
period from the last period backwards. If a lawsuit were to be
credibly filed and not settled immediately due to differing beliefs
{pt} or lack of common knowledge over the distributions of (Jt},
(It}, and {Ct], it might settle nonetheless at some later period, e.g.,
239. See, e.g., MICELI, supra note 31, at 157-58 (explaining the differingperceptions model).
240. See, e.g., Cornell, supra note 37, at 180-81 (giving an example of the
options model of a lawsuit).
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after discovery, due to convergence of probability beliefs (pt} or
common knowledge about {Jt}, {It}, and (Ct}. In particular,
optimism or self-serving biases can prevent immediate settlement, as
is the case in expected-value litigation models. 24 1 Finally, notice
that higher than expected realized litigation costs may cause a
plaintiff unilaterally to drop her lawsuit, because the actual premium
of the litigation-abandonment option at that stage exceeds its value.
D.

Qualitative Comparative Statics or
Analysis

Sensitivity

A game-theoretic options model of litigation has different
implications for how various policies or shifts in the underlying legal
random variables change the incentives to file litigation and the size
of Nash-equilibrium settlement amounts than those that are predicted
by game-theoretic expected value models of litigation. Economists
utilize the phrase "comparative-statics analysis" to refer to a
comparison of how equilibrium behavior differs for different
parameter values. 24 2 Another way to think of a comparative-statics
result is that it analyzes how sensitive behavior endogenously
determined in equilibrium is to changes in exogenous variables.
Thus, comparative-statics results are forms of sensitivity analysis. In
this Article's game-theoretic options model of litigation, many of
these comparative-statics results are driven by the fact that the option
value of a random variable increases with its variance because of the
option to avoid downside risk, while a random variable's expected
value does not necessarily increase with its variance.
The first comparative statics result concerns the awarding of
punitive damages, 24 3 a practice in certain areas of the law, such as
241.

See Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining

Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1997, at 109,

111-16 (1997) (using the example of a Texas tort case).
242. See, e.g., ALPHA C. CHIANG, FUNDAMENTAL METHODS OF
MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 127-28 (3d ed. 1984) (explaining the method of

comparative statics); LIONEL W. MCKENZIE, CLASSICAL GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
THEORY 133-64 (2002) (presenting a detailed and rigorous treatment of
comparative

statics);

PAUL

A.

SAMUELSON,

FOUNDATIONS

OF

ECONOMIC

ANALYSIS 20 (enlarged ed. 1983) (defining comparative statics).
243.

See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive

Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARv. L. REV. 869 (1998) (providing

principles of economics to analyze punitive damages question, in light of
deterrence and punishment goals); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Do People Want
Optimal Deterrence?, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE 132, 132-34
(Cass R. Sunstein et al. ed., 2002) (exploring the economic theory of deterrence
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treble damages in antitrust, 2 4 4 punitive multiples in certain tort
actions, 2 4 5 or willful contract breach. Punitive damages increase the
incentive to file lawsuits because such damages increase the amount
of expected judgments. But, above and beyond the mean-increasing
effect on judgments, punitive damages also increase the variance of
judgments, and hence, they not only increase the net present
discounted values, but also the option values, of settlement.
Proposition 4: Holding all other variables fixed, punitive
damages increase the incentives to file lawsuits and equilibrium
settlement amounts more than just a variance-preserving increase in
judgments by the same factor as the punitive multiple does.
Proof: All other things being equal, punitive damages
increase the variance of xt for all t and thus increase OVl(st) for all t.
Thus, the necessary and sufficient conditions for filing lawsuits are
more likely to hold with punitive damages than without punitive
damages. In addition, the necessary and sufficient conditions for
filing lawsuits are more likely to hold with punitive damages than
with merely a variance-preserving increase in judgments by the same
factor as the punitive multiple.
The other side of the above result concerns the frequently
suggested policy of capping the damages that juries can award.
Although these proposals usually lament both the unpredictability
and seemingly random nature of jury awards, the argument behind
these reforms focuses on the absolute magnitude of the punitive
component of jury awards. A game-theoretic options model of

tied to punitive damages). See also John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some
Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REv. 965,

994-97 (1984) (discussing damage multipliers as a sliding scale, decreasing as the
probability of getting caught goes up); Richard Craswell, Damage Multipliers in
Market Relationships, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 478-87 (1996) (explaining the

shortcomings of damage multipliers in market relationships, with reference to cost
increases, risk tolerances, and probability of punishment); Richard Craswell,
Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives, 97 MICH.
L. REv. 2185, 2187 (1999) (explaining why the multiplier principle is not

necessary for optimal deterrence and discussing alternatives); Richard Craswell &
John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
279, 292-97 (1986) (discussing damage multipliers).
244. Clayton Act, ch. 323, §4(a), 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914).
245. See, e.g., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489, 492

(1875) (holding that punitive damages were "too well-settled now to be shaken,
that exemplary damages may in certain cases be assessed").
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litigation makes clear that not only the size of expected punitive
damages, but also the variance of punitive damages affects the
incentives to sue and settle. This is because, above and beyond the
mean-decreasing effect on judgments, damage caps also decrease the
variance of judgments. Hence, they not only decrease the net present
values but also the option values of settlement.
Proposition 5: Holding all other variables fixed, damage caps
decrease the incentives to file lawsuits and equilibrium settlement
amounts more that just a variance-preserving decrease in judgments
by the same factor as the damage caps.
Proof: All other things being equal, damage caps decrease the
variance of xt for all t and thus decrease OVl(st) for all t. Therefore,
the necessary and sufficient conditions for filing lawsuits are less
likely to hold than with damage caps than without damage caps. In
addition, the necessary and sufficient conditions for filing lawsuits
are less likely to hold with damage caps than with merely a variancepreserving decrease in judgments by the same factor as the damage
caps.
The above two results concerning effects on incentives to file
lawsuits of substantive or procedural reforms are special cases of the
next general comparative-statics result about how the abandonmentoption value of a lawsuit changes as the variance of the trialjudgment award changes.
Proposition 6: Holding all other variables fixed, an increase
(respectively, decrease) in the variance of the trial judgment award
increases (respectively, decreases) the incentives to file lawsuits and
equilibrium settlement amounts.
Proof: All other things being equal, higher (respectively,
lower) variance in the trial judgment award increases (respectively,
decreases) OVl(st) for all t. Thus, the necessary and sufficient
conditions for filing a lawsuit are more (respectively, less) likely to
hold with changes in the variance of the trial-judgment award than
without such changes.
The next result provides a set of conditions under which the
English rule for allocating legal costs, under which the party losing
at trial is required to also pay for the winning party's legal costs,
increases the incentive to file lawsuits and equilibrium settlement
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amounts. Professor Cornell observed that even risk-neutral plaintiffs
are better off under the English rule for allocating litigation costs
than under the American rule for allocating litigation costs, under
which each side of litigation pays for its own legal costs. This is due
to the increased variance of trial outcomes, when taking into account
paying for legal costs under the English rule for allocating litigation
costs as compared to the American rule for allocating litigation
costs. 246 But a lawsuit having an expected judgment of x under the
American rule becomes a lawsuit having an expected judgment of
x+pP-(1-p)D under the English rule. Thus, shifting from the
American rule to the English rule not only increases the variance of,
but also changes the mean of, trial outcomes. Hence, whether the
English rule increases or decreases the likelihood of litigation and
settlement amounts compared to the American rule depends
respectively on whether the English rule's variance-increasing effect
on the plaintiffs abandonment-option value outweighs its meandecreasing effect on the plaintiff's abandonment option value or vice
versa. As the next result makes clear, a sufficient condition for the
English rule's variance-increasing effect on the plaintiffs
abandonment-option value to outweigh its mean-decreasing effect on
the plaintiffs abandonment-option value is that for all t, ptEt(P) >
(1-pt)Et(D).
Proposition 7: If for all t, ptEt(P) > (1-pt)Et(D), then the
English rule increases the likelihood of filing a lawsuit and the
2 47
settlement amount compared to the American rule.
Proof: Litigation under the English rule instead of the
American rule changes both the mean and variance of the litigation
process. At each period t, the expected judgment changes from xt to
xt+ptEt(P)-(1-pt)Et(D), where the conditional expected values Et(P)
and Et(D) are conditional on the realized values of litigation costs up
to stage t for the plaintiff and defendant, respectively. By hypothesis,
for all t, xt+ptEt(P)-(1-pt)Et(D)> xt. Thus, the English rule does not
decrease the expected judgment compared with the American rule.
The English rule also increases the variance in expected judgment
compared with the American rule. Each of these effects on the mean
and variance of judgment increases OVl(st). But the English rule
246. See Cornell, supra note 37, at 186 (stating that the English rule would
increase incentive to sue because of increased variance in the final award).
247. If it is not true that for all t, ptE,(P) > (1-pdEt(D).
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does not change the plaintiffs litigation costs at any given stage
because they are incurred sequentially. Thus, the necessary and
sufficient condition for filing a lawsuit is more likely to hold under
the English rule for allocating litigation costs than under the
American rule for allocating litigation costs.
The next proposition explains how the option value of a
lawsuit changes as the variance of the defendant's litigation costs
changes, all other things being equal. More (respectively, less) risk
over the defendant's legal costs at any given stage increases
(respectively, decreases) a plaintiff's incentive to file a lawsuit
because of the increased (respectively, decreased) savings in
defendant's avoided legal costs from settling before that stage.
Proposition 8: Holding all other variables fixed, increasing
(respectively, decreasing) the variance of defendant's litigation costs
at any stage k < n, increases (respectively, decreases) the incentives
to file lawsuits and equilibrium settlement amounts.
Proof: Holding all other variables fixed, more (respectively,
less) variance in the defendant's litigation costs at stage k < n
increases (respectively, decreases) OVl(st) for all t < k. Thus, the
necessary and sufficient conditions for filing a lawsuit are more
(respectively, less) likely to hold with changes in the variance of the
defendant's litigation costs than without changes in the variance of
the defendant's litigation costs.
Because changing the variance of the plaintiffs litigation
costs also generally changes the mean of the plaintiffs litigation
costs; changing the variance of the plaintiffs litigation costs affects
both sides of the inequalities from the necessary and sufficient
conditions for the (credible) filing of a lawsuit. To isolate the impact
of changing the variance of the plaintiffs litigation costs upon the
option value of lawsuit, the next proposition analyzes how the option
value of a lawsuit changes as the variance of plaintiffs litigation
costs changes in a mean-preservingmanner.
Proposition 9: Holding all other variables fixed, a meanpreserving increase (respectively, decrease) in the variance of
plaintiffs litigation costs at any stage k < n, increases (respectively,
decreases) the incentives to file lawsuits and equilibrium settlement
amounts.
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Proof: All other things being equal, higher (respectively,
lower) variance in the plaintiffs litigation costs at stage k increases
(respectively, decreases) OVI(s) for all t < k. Thus, the necessary
and sufficient condition for filing a lawsuit is more likely to hold
with mean-preserving changes in the variance of the plaintiffs
litigation costs than without mean-preserving changes in the variance
of the plaintiffs litigation costs.
The next proposition analytically demonstrates how this
appendix's model of initially NEV lawsuits due to non-negative
values of litigation-abandonment options generalizes Bebchuk's
model of NEV litigation.
Proposition 10: The set of parameter values for which
initially NEV lawsuits are brought is larger than in Bebchuk's model
of NEV litigation. 2 4 8 The difference between the set of parameter
values for which NEV lawsuits are filed in a game-theoretic options
model and Bebchuk's game-theoretic expected-value model of
litigation is a function of the difference between OVI(s) and El(st),
which in turn depends on the ability to subdivide the litigation into
stages and the opportunities to learn more information.
Proof: Bebchuk's conditions for the filing of a lawsuit can be
thought of as t, El(s) > It. Bebchuk's model describes the situation
of a lawsuit in which the values of all of the variables are known
with certainty by the litigants.
Under symmetric uncertainty,
Bebchuk's conditions become El(s) > El(It). Because the lawsuit
can be dropped t, OVl(st) > 0 and moreover OVI(s) > El(s). Thus,
whenever EJ(st) > E(It), OVI(sO > El(Ut) also holds. But, OVJ(sO
> El(It) can hold even though E (It) > El(s.
Interpreting a comparison between the relative sizes of the set
of parameter values in Bebchuk's non-stochastic model that satisfy
the necessary and sufficient conditions for the credible filing of NEV
lawsuits with that of the set of paraneter values in this appendix's
stochastic litigation abandonment options model that satisfy the
necessary and sufficient conditions for the credible filing of initially
NEV lawsuits requires a bit of care. When any non-stochastic model
is embedded in a stochastic model involving the same variables as in
the non-stochastic model, the whole parameter space of the non-

248.

Bebchuk, supra note 47, at 14.
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stochastic model is only a single point in the parameter space of the
stochastic model. In other words, for most economically and legally
relevant choices of topologies and measures, the entire parameter
space of the non-stochastic model will only be a small or negligible
set in the parameter space of the stochastic model. 2 4 9 Thus, any
proper subset of the parameter space of the non-stochastic model is a
fortiori a small and negligible proper subset in the parameter space
of the stochastic model. It thus comes as no surprise that a stochastic
game-theoretic options model of NEV litigation generalizes
Bebchuk's non-stochastic game-theoretic expected value model of
NEV litigation because any stochastic model generalizes any nonstochastic model involving the same variables in the sense that
stochastic random variables generalize non-stochastic random
variables.
The next two results analyze the impact of changes in a
plaintiffs litigation costs on that plaintiffs incentive to file litigation
and the resulting equilibrium settlement amount. Increased or
greater divisibility of a plaintiffs legal costs only bolstered the
credibility of a plaintiffs threats to continue a lawsuit in Bebchuk's
251
nonstochastic model 2 5 0 and Comell's non-game-theoretic model.
A similar proposition holds in this Article's game-theoretic
stochastic model.

249. The precise notion of "small" depends on how we measure risk. For
example, if risk involves a family of normal distributions, the parameter space of

the stochastic model is that of the mean and variance of normally distributed
random variables and the non-stochastic model is described by a point, which is a
closed set of measure zero in the non-negative quadrant of the Euclidean plane. If
the risk involves a family of smooth distributions restricted to have finite variance,
then a natural parameter space of the stochastic model is the infinite dimensional
function space L2 and the non-stochastic model is described by a set consisting of
a single point, which is a small or negligible set for most economically, legally,
and mathematically relevant or appropriate choices of topologies and measures.
For technical details, see RALPH ABRAHAM ET AL., MANIFOLDS: TENSOR
ANALYSIS, AND APPLICATIONS 2, 399, 551 (1983) (defining closed set, Lp spaces,

and measure zero).
250. Bebchuk, supra note 47, at 15 n. 11. See also Lucian A. Bebchuk, On
Divisibility and Credibility: The Effects of the Distribution of Litigation Costs

Over Time on the Credibility of Threats to Sue, John M. Olin Center in Law,
Economics, and Business Discussion Paper No. 190, Harvard Law School (August

1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Review of Litigation).
251.

Cornell, supra note 37, at 184.

Winter 2004]

LITIGATION ABANDONMENT

Proposition 11: A finer partition of a plaintiffs legal costs
can only bolster the credibility of that plaintiff's threats to continue a
lawsuit and therefore increase equilibrium settlement amounts.
Proof: Let a finer partition of the plaintiffs legal costs be
formed by at least subdividing some stage k into two substages: i and
j. By construction, the plaintiffs legal costs in stage k can be
decomposed into two component legal costs in stage i and stage j: Ik
= Ii + j. If the plaintiff initially had credible threats for continuing
the lawsuit through to trial, then by proposition 1, option values of
settlement at each stage are larger than the initial expected premia of
those continuation options. In other words, for all t _<n; these
inequalities hold at date 1: OVl(st) > E (It). In particular, at stage 1
it is expected that at stage k, OVl(sk) > El(Ik) = E li) + EI(Ij). By
definition of the random variables st, sk = si = sj because there is no
intermediate bargaining between stages k and k+l. Thus, OVl(si) =
OVl(sk) > El(Ik) > El(Ii) and OVl(sj) = OVl(sk) > El(Ik) > EI(Ij).
By proposition 1, this means that all of the plaintiffs threats for
continuing the lawsuit through to trial remain credible.
If the plaintiff initially did not have a credible threat at stage
k for continuing the lawsuit through to trial, then by proposition 1,
OVl(sk) < El(Ik) = El(Ii) + EI(Ij). As noted above, sk = si = sj
because there is no intermediate bargaining between stages k and
k+]. It is now possible that both OVl(sk) ? El(Ii) and OVl(sk) >
E(I ) . Of course, that is not guaranteed because it is also possible
that OVl(sk) < El(I) yet OVl(sk) ? El(j), or OVl(sk) > El(Ii) yet
OVl(sk) < El(I), or OVl(sk) < El(Ii) and OVl(sk) < EI(Ij). If any
one of these three possibilities holds, then the plaintiff is initially
expected not to have a credible threat at stage i, j, or both for
continuing the lawsuit through to trial.
In Cornell's non-game-theoretic model, front-loading a
plaintiffs legal costs, meaning increasing that plaintiffs expected
litigation costs at earlier stages while preserving the plaintiffs total
expected litigation costs, reduced that plaintiffs litigationabandonment-option value. 2 5 2 A similar proposition holds in this
Article's game-theoretic stochastic model.

252.

See Blanton, supra note 39, at 161, 186 (explaining that rules enabling

the plaintiff to spread the litigation over more steps, while maintaining total
litigation costs at a constant, raises the option value of litigation).
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Proposition 12: Holding all other variables fixed, frontloading a plaintiffs litigation costs decreases the incentives to file
lawsuits and equilibrium settlement amounts.
Proof: All other things being fixed, front-loading a plaintiffs
litigation costs increases El(It) for initial values of t = 1, 2 . . . .
Thus, the necessary and sufficient conditions for initially filing
lawsuits are less likely to hold when a plaintiffs litigation costs are
front-loaded than when a plaintiffs litigation costs are not frontloaded.
Conversely, back-loading a plaintiffs legal costs, meaning
decreasing that plaintiffs expected litigation costs at earlier stages
while preserving the plaintiffs total expected litigation costs,
increases that plaintiff s litigation-abandonment-option value.
Proposition 13: Holding all other variables fixed, backloading a plaintiffs litigation costs increases the incentives to file
lawsuits and equilibrium settlement amounts.
Proof: All other things being held equal, back-loading a
plaintiff's litigation costs decreases El (It) for initial values of t = 1,
2 ....
Thus, the necessary and sufficient conditions for initially
filing lawsuits are more likely to hold when a plaintiffs litigation
costs are back-loaded than when a plaintiffs litigation costs are not
back-loaded.
In Cornell's non-game-theoretic model, increasing a
plaintiffs total legal costs reduced that plaintiffs litigationabandonment-option value. 253 A similar proposition holds in this
Article's game-theoretic stochastic model.
Proposition 14: Holding all other variables fixed, increasing
a plaintiffs total expected litigation costs decreases that plaintiffs
incentives to file lawsuits and equilibrium settlement amount.
Proof: All other things being held fixed, increasing a
plaintiff's total expected litigation costs increases El(It) for some
253. See Blanton, supra note 39, at 161, 186 (citing Cornell's observation
that increasing a plaintiffs initial expenditure to gain information reduces the
option value of the litigation).
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value(s) of t. Thus, at least one of the necessary and sufficient
conditions for initially filing lawsuits is less likely to hold when a
plaintiffs total expected litigation costs increase than when a
plaintiffs total expected litigation costs stay constant.
Conversely, decreasing a plaintiff's total legal costs increases
that plaintiff's litigation-abandonment-option value.
Proposition 15: Holding all other variables fixed, decreasing
a plaintiffs total expected litigation costs increases that plaintiffs
incentives to file lawsuits and equilibrium settlement amount.
Proof: All other things being equal, decreasing a plaintiff's
total expected litigation costs decreases E1 (It) for some value(s) of t.
Thus, at least one of the necessary and sufficient conditions for
initially filing lawsuits is more likely to hold when a plaintiffs total
expected litigation costs decrease than when a plaintiffs total
expected litigation costs do not change.

